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ABSTRACT 
 
Bayesian Network Analysis of Radiological Dispersal Device Acquisitions. 
(December 2010) 
Grant Richard Hundley, B.S., United States Naval Academy 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Charlton 
 
 It remains unlikely that a terrorist organization could produce or procure an 
actual nuclear weapon.  However, the construction of a radiological dispersal device 
(RDD) from commercially produced radioactive sources and conventional explosives 
could inflict moderate human casualties and significant economic damage.  The vast 
availability of radioactive sources and the nearly limitless methods of dispersing them 
demand an inclusive study of the acquisition pathways for an RDD.  A complete 
network depicting the possible acquisition pathways for an RDD could be subjected to 
predictive modeling in order to determine the most likely pathway an adversary might 
take.  In this work, a comprehensive network of RDD acquisition pathways was 
developed and analyzed utilizing the Bayesian network analysis software, Netica.  The 
network includes variable inputs and motivations that can be adjusted to model different 
adversaries.  Also, the inclusion of evidence nodes facilitates the integration of real-time 
intelligence with RDD plot predictions. 
 A sensitivity analysis was first performed to determine which nodes had the 
greatest impact on successful completion of RDD acquisition.  These results detail which 
portions of the acquisition pathways are most vulnerable to law enforcement 
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intervention.  Next, a series of case studies was analyzed that modeled specific 
adversarial organizations.  The analysis demonstrates various features of the constructed 
Bayesian RDD acquisition network and provides examples of how this tool can be 
utilized by intelligence analysts and law enforcement agencies.  Finally, extreme cases 
were studied in which the adversary was given the maximum and minimum amount of 
resources in order to determine the limitations of this model.   
The aggregated results show that successful RDD acquisition is mostly 
dependent on the adversary’s resources.  Furthermore, the network suggests that 
securing radiological materials has the greatest effect on interdicting possible RDD 
plots.   Limitations of this work include a heavy dependence on conditional probabilities 
that were derived from intuition, as opposed to actual historical data which does not 
exist.  However, the model can be updated as attempted or successful RDD plots emerge 
in the future.  This work presents the first probabilistic model of RDD acquisition 
pathways that integrates adversary motivations and resources with evidence of specific 
RDD threats. 
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_____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Nuclear Technology. 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The threat of terrorism has evolved rapidly in the past decade.  A post 9/11 world 
has seen enhanced domestic security efforts that have forced terrorists to apply an ever-
increasing will and creativity towards future attacks.  This innovation, coupled with the 
vast availability of radioactive sources in nearly every country across the globe, makes a 
radiological dispersal device (RDD) an attractive option for an adversary seeking 
civilian deaths, chaos, and economic consequences.  An RDD, in the most basic sense, is 
a device that exposes people to radioactive materials.  However, this work will address 
RDDs that include explosive mixtures as the dispersal method.  The substantial variety 
of radioactive sources and the numerous methods of dispersing them imply a nearly 
limitless number of possible designs.  A study of RDDs is further convoluted by the 
number of adversaries willing to do harm to the United States.  Groups ranging from a 
homegrown Al-Qaeda influenced cell to a well-equipped drug cartel could all benefit 
from the acquisition of an RDD.  However, each adversary’s ultimate motivations 
strongly influence the type of device they would want and the ultimate consequences of 
a successful plot.  This variety of potential RDD threats, coupled with the vast disparity 
in damage and effects of different designs, demands an inclusive study of the acquisition 
pathways for an RDD. 
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This thesis presents the first probabilistic analysis of RDD acquisition pathways. 
Utilizing Bayesian analysis of a thoroughly developed network of RDD acquisition 
pathways, predictions about the most likely RDD plots are developed.  Specific 
characteristics about potential adversaries are integrated into the network to provide a 
flexible intelligence tool capable of modeling various RDD threats.  The inclusion of 
pathway evidence allows the user to adjust the network to include plot actions the 
adversary may have already completed.  This feature facilitates the focusing of law 
enforcement resources on likely adversary actions. 
 
Background 
 The terrorist of the twenty-first century is unconventional, creative, and 
desperate.  For an adversary with these characteristics, an RDD is the ideal weapon.  The 
potential consequences of a successful RDD detonation far outweigh the effort to gather 
radiological materials and construct a device.
1
  Capitalizing on the public’s nearly 
universal fear of radiation inspired by Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and the Cold War, 
the effects of an RDD would reach much further than injury and fatality due to radiation 
sickness.  Upon learning of an RDD detonation, people in the target area would panic 
and mass hysteria would ensue.  After the area was secured, the environmental cleanup 
would take months to years and billions of dollars would be spent.  Businesses located in 
the area would be devastated.  Global markets would plummet in a similar response to 
the effects of 9/11.  The political effects would be polarizing.  And, most importantly, 
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terrorist adversaries across the globe would be further empowered in a seemingly 
unmanageable War on Terror. 
  The unconventional nature of terrorism is epitomized by the defining moment of 
the twenty-first century: the attacks of September 11, 2001.  As two fuel-laden passenger 
airplanes struck the towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in 
Pennsylvania, the terrorist playbook quickly expanded upon traditional car bombings 
and shootings.  Al-Qaeda pioneered an approach to terrorism that did more than kill and 
injure innocent Americans.  Today’s terrorist, more than ever, strives to strike absolute 
fear into the hearts of their adversaries.  This fear-based approach turned to suicide 
bombers, beheadings, and the holy grail of unconventional, fear-inducing terrorism: 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).   
 Anti-terrorism security measures implemented after 9/11 have also forced the 
modern terrorist to approach attacks with a renewed creativity.  Thorough airport 
screening methods have all but secured domestic passenger flights from conventional 
hijackings and bombing methods.  Law enforcement surveillance is now capable of 
signaling terrorist plots by examining the purchase of devices and materials utilized to 
fabricate explosives.  Monitoring of outgoing e-mail communications to international 
terrorist networks has netted large groups of individuals proclaiming a desire to harm 
America.  The impetus for the implementation of most of these security measures has 
been a response to an attempted or successful attack.  For example, requiring passengers 
to remove their shoes for screening prior to boarding a flight is a specific response to 
Richard Reid’s attempted shoe bombing.2  While these measures are likely to prevent a 
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repeat attempt of a specific plot, they are less successful at preventing innovative and 
creative attacks.  Terrorists have capitalized on this weakness.  Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab’s attempted underwear bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 
typifies this creative approach to modern terrorism.  Figure 1 presents an image of the 
underwear utilized to conceal plastic explosives in the attempted attack.
3
  Airport 
security measures at the time were unable to detect the explosive device.  Terrorists 
seeking to perform a creative attack, such as an underwear bomb, would find an RDD to 
be an attractive option.  RDDs have a wide range of sizes, and can be delivered through 
numerous methods.  Furthermore, materials to construct an RDD could be obtained 
inside the borders of the United States.  Even only a small amount of radioactive 
material, dispersed in a creative method, could have drastic consequences.  There is only 
one certainty about a future RDD attack.  The device, whether crude or extremely 
advanced, will be designed with a high level of creativity. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Abdulmutallab’s underwear used to conceal plastic explosives. 
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 Finally, the terrorist of the twenty-first century is desperate.  A significant 
military presence in Afghanistan and counter-terrorism operations across the globe have 
succeeded in hampering terrorist activities.  While terrorist groups retain high levels of 
recruitment and growing support, their leadership and funding sources are gradually 
being eliminated.  Consequently, today’s terrorist needs to execute successful attacks on 
a frequent basis to convey prestige, corner funding, and maintain both direct and indirect 
state support.  Faisal Shahzad’s May 2010 attempted Times Square bombing 
demonstrates this nature of desperation.  The plot, funded by the Pakistani Taliban, 
consisted of a crudely designed explosive device placed in the back of a Nissan 
Pathfinder.  The assortment of improvised explosives used in the vehicle included five 
gallon gas cans, 20 gallon propane tanks, firecrackers, and 250 pounds of urea based 
fertilizer encased in a metal gun locker.
4
  A diagram of the charges within the vehicle is 
seen in Fig. 2.  It is interesting to note that urea based fertilizer requires processing prior 
to its use as an explosive.  A more sophisticated and knowledgeable adversary would 
have likely chosen ammonium nitrate fertilizer.  From a technical standpoint, this poorly 
designed device is a step back from the advanced improvised explosive devices seen in 
other terrorist attacks.  However, it certainly portrays a desperate adversary eager to 
execute a successful plot.  This desperation makes an RDD plot a very attractive option.  
Some experts argue that certain terrorist groups would hesitate to utilize WMD—even if 
they had access to such weapons.
5
  On the other hand, adversaries previously unwilling 
to resort to WMD may change their mind in the face of such desperation.  Limited 
funding and technical knowledge may prevent the development of a conventional 
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terrorist attack.  Consequently, the use of a well-designed RDD may result in more 
destruction and devastation for the same contribution of effort and funding. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Positioning of charges inside the vehicle used in the May 2010 Times Square 
attempted bombing. 
 
 
Motivation  
 Although an RDD has never successfully been employed as a terrorist weapon, it 
offers significant advantages to an adversary that may have poor funding and little 
technical capability.  Many experts agree that a typical RDD attack would be incapable 
of causing mass civilian casualties.  In fact, the only people likely to receive a lethal 
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dose of radiation would probably have to be close enough to the blast to have been killed 
or wounded by the blast itself.
6
  However, the use of a radiological weapon would incite 
chaos and panic among local populations, and could have potentially devastating 
economic effects.  On September 13, 1987, 1375 Curies of 
137
Cs chloride was released 
into the town of Goiânia, Brazil after two scrap metal scavengers looted a teletherapy 
machine.  The source was removed from its sealed container and passed around the 
community.  After medical personnel identified the radiological release, 112,000 people 
flocked to the city’s soccer stadium for medical evaluation; 49 of those people were 
admitted to the hospital, and five individuals died.  During cleanup operations, 85 
buildings were determined contaminated, and seven were eventually demolished.
6
  The 
incident in Goiânia, while not exactly parallel to an RDD attack, demonstrates the 
potential consequences from a radiological release in an urban population.  If a similar 
incident occurred in downtown Manhattan, one could imagine the resulting panic and 
economic consequences of an evacuated Wall Street.  The simplicity of an RDD and the 
availability of radiological materials imply that an RDD is capable of yielding an impact 
highly disproportionate to the risks and costs of carrying out such an attack.
1
  It is 
important to note that, although unlikely, a technically advanced and well-funded 
adversary could create a sophisticated device capable of inflicting mass casualties. 
 
Objectives 
 This work has two main objectives in order to counter the threat that radiological 
terrorism poses to the United States of America.  The first objective is to provide a 
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comprehensive picture of all available pathways to RDD acquisition.  This is the first 
work to explicitly describe the variety of steps necessary to assemble an RDD.  The vast 
availability of radioactive sources and the nearly limitless methods of dispersing them 
demand an inclusive study of the acquisition pathways for an RDD.  A complete 
network depicting the possible acquisition pathways for an RDD could be subjected to 
predictive modeling in order to determine the most likely pathway an adversary might 
take. 
 The second objective of this work is to develop an analysis tool to analyze RDD 
acquisitions that is capable of integrating with real-time intelligence.  A Bayesian 
analysis will permit the calculation of pathway completion probability.  Additionally, the 
inclusion of node customization will allow this tool to become adaptable to developing 
security situations and terrorist threats.  By integrating real-time intelligence signatures 
about possible terrorist actions, node probabilities can be adjusted to judge pathway 
completion and predict future terrorist actions.  Fig. 3 depicts a visual representation of 
how the objectives of this work can be achieved through the use of a Bayesian network 
analysis.  The three boxes in the top row represent inputs describing the adversary’s 
characteristics.  The four boxes in the second row represent the four pieces of 
information that feed into the Bayesian analysis: adversary motivations, adversary 
characteristics, priors, and evidence.  Finally, the three boxes in the bottom row 
represent what information the Bayesian analysis provides in order to meet the stated 
objectives. 
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Fig. 3. Visual depiction of the inputs and outputs of a Bayesian network analysis. 
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Previous Work 
 An open-source, probabilistic analysis of RDD acquisitions has not been 
previously performed.  However, past research has investigated Bayesian analysis of 
nuclear weapon and improvised nuclear device acquisitions.  Although these efforts 
address the development of nuclear fission devices, a fundamentally different process 
than the construction of an RDD, the objectives, Bayesian approach, and developed 
procedures parallel this proposed work.  A thesis by Freeman presented the first 
Bayesian network analysis of nuclear acquisitions.  The motivations and resources of 
state and terrorist organizations were evaluated to produce probability distributions for 
nodes within a network depicting the various pathways to nuclear weapon acquisitions.  
Evidence nodes allow for users of the network to integrate intelligence that may suggest 
which path an adversary has chosen to take.  As the Bayesian beliefs are updated across 
the network, a relative probability of success can be calculated for various adversaries.
7
  
A thesis by Ford also presents an assessment tool for nuclear material acquisition 
pathways.  This approach, however, used a resource based decision model implemented 
in Visual Basic.
8
  Another paper by Eaton and Miller examines the terrorist acquisition 
of improvised nuclear devices.  This Bayesian analysis, similar to the work done by 
Freeman, utilizes expert elicitation to determine which pathways are most likely for 
various terrorist organizations.
9
  Both Bayesian analyses utilize a software package 
called Netica; which is the proposed method for this work.  This previous work suggests 
that a Bayesian analysis of RDD acquisitions should be capable of providing the results 
detailed in the objectives of this research. 
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Other previous work has discussed radiological weapons as a form of terrorism 
and addressed the motivations of terrorist organizations who may utilize WMD.  While 
not directly applicable to a probabilistic analysis of RDD acquisitions, they provide 
important context as to why a terrorist organization may choose to utilize an RDD.  
Poston, in a keynote address, explains that an RDD is an ideal terrorist weapon and 
reasons that the United States is ill-prepared to respond to such an event.
10
  A thesis by 
Elder discusses the terrorist act of releasing 
210
Po inside an aircraft cabin.  This work 
presents a detailed analysis of the likely radiologic effects, and provides interesting 
information about the weaponization of radioactive sources.
11
  MacKerrow addresses the 
broad reasons why radical Islamist terrorism frequently targets America.  Using a 
modeling approach called agent-based simulation, his work explores terrorist 
motivations from a social-economic perspective.
12
  A paper by Darby evaluates the risk 
for acts of terrorism with belief and fuzzy sets.  While this approach utilizes a different 
type of modeling than the one proposed, his conclusions demonstrate the effectiveness of 
a quantitative approach to the mitigation of terrorist acts.
13
   
While this thesis presents the first probabilistic modeling of RDD acquisitions, a 
great deal of previous work indicates the overall utility of such research.  Bayesian 
modeling of both terrorist and state actor acquisition of nuclear weapons suggests a 
similar analysis of RDD acquisitions will have a successful outcome.  Finally, previous 
work concerning radiological weapons as a means of terrorism should provide a sound 
background for the integration of RDD acquisition pathways with underlying terrorist 
motivations.  
12 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
NETWORK DEVELOPMENT 
Network Overview 
 The first task of this work was to develop a complete network of the various 
pathways to RDD acquisition.  These pathways are numerous and interconnected.  Each 
decision or action an adversary makes can affect both subsequent and prior nodes in the 
network.  Unlike a relatively linear pathway analysis of nuclear weapon acquisitions, an 
adversary pursuing an RDD can alternate pathways or even omit large portions of the 
network and still produce a formidable device.  To account for this complexity, the 
developed RDD acquisition network was split into four separate tasks.  These tasks 
include adversarial motivation, radioactive material acquisition, weaponization, and 
assembly and detonation.  A final portion of the network provides an overview of the 
RDD’s design and probability of success.  In most cases, the adversary’s pathway will at 
least traverse through the motivation, radioactive material acquisition, and assembly and 
detonation portions of the network.  The weaponization portion of the network is not a 
requisite to a successful RDD detonation.  Successfully traversing this portion of the 
network, however, has important implications in the eventual device effectiveness and 
subsequent pathway chosen.  The development of each of the five portions paints an 
important picture about the varied tasks necessary for a successful RDD detonation.  
Conversely, this also suggests numerous ways an adversary can be detected and 
defeated. 
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Adversarial Motivation 
 The first portion of the network considers the motivations of the adversary.  
While inherently less tangible than other tasks such as radioactive material acquisition 
and source weaponization, adversarial motivation plays an important role in determining 
the path that a terrorist may take towards RDD acquisition.  The flexible and variable 
nature of the RDD threat implies that significantly different RDD designs may meet 
specific terrorist motivations.  For example, a crude and poorly weaponized device 
might be sufficient to fulfill motivations such as mass devastation or to manipulate 
policy.  On the other hand, the intention to redress conventional military asymmetry or 
wage war on another nation would require a much more sophisticated device.  If a 
certain organization’s ultimate motivations are known, then later nodes in possible 
acquisition pathways may become more likely.  Kristin Childress, a student of Texas 
A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, studied terrorism with the goal 
of linking a terrorist’s motivation for nuclear terrorism to specific nuclear threats.  The 
following is a list of the eleven terrorist motivations developed by Childress and utilized 
in this work: 
 
1. Peaceful Prestige of Capabilities: Possessing the capability for 
terrorism demonstrates an organization’s viability and legitimacy. The 
group believes that simply possessing the ability to successfully 
complete a nuclear terrorist threat will achieve its goals, and finds the 
14 
 
 
actual event to be unnecessary. It is also possible that the group may 
detonate a weapon as a show of strength in a non-populated area. 
 
2. Non-Peaceful Prestige of Capabilities: Possessing the capability for 
terrorism demonstrates an organization’s viability and legitimacy. The 
group clearly has no problem using nuclear terrorism to achieve their 
goals. 
 
3. Manipulate Adversaries: A group pursues nuclear terrorism to use as 
leverage against or to demonstrate a weakness in other organizations 
or nations. 
 
4. Apocalyptic Beliefs: The organization believes that the end of the 
world is near and is motivated to take an active role in promoting the 
event. 
 
5. War on Own Nation: Separatist or nationalist group that wants to use 
nuclear terrorism to combat, overthrow, or undermine the current 
government of a country. 
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6. War on Another Nation: The organization has a deep hatred for a 
particular people or nation and they feel compelled to use nuclear 
terrorism to combat or enact revenge upon their adversary. 
 
7. Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry: An organization has a 
finite amount of people and resources to combat a nation, and seeks to 
use nuclear terrorism to redress this imbalance. 
 
8. Organizational Security: A group pursues nuclear terrorism in order to 
protect citizens/members of a certain group (religious, political, 
ethnic, etc.) from attack or persecution. 
 
9. Mass Devastation or Chaos: The group is motivated to wreck 
economic, political and psychological havoc on a population, and thus 
devastate the nation’s infrastructure or population by nuclear 
terrorism. In this case, the violence is the end in itself. 
 
10. Religious Imperative: Religious extremists that believe they have 
been given a religious mandate or imperative to pursue the nuclear 
threat. 
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11. Manipulate Policy: A group seeks to use the nuclear threat to bring 
attention to or change a specific policy (political, economic, religious, 
etc) that it does not agree with. 
 
Inclusion of these eleven varied motivations describes the reasons why an 
organization may choose to pursue an RDD.   However, knowledge of a specific 
adversarial motivation does not intuitively convey how that motivation will affect the 
eventual pathway.  To account for this fact, four specific device intentions are included 
in this portion of the network.  These device intentions are derived from a single 
motivation or a combination of multiple motivations from probability distributions.  The 
implementation of these intentions follows a model suggested by Freeman.
7
  Figure 4 
demonstrates how adversary motivations lead to device intentions and eventually affect 
the pathway chosen.  The following is a list of the four device characteristics included in 
this work: 
 
1. Need for Even Dispersal: The adversary seeks to deny a large area by 
the dispersal of radioactive material.  Or, the adversary seeks to harm 
a significant portion of the human population in the target area.  Both 
goals require a finely weaponized source capable of increasing 
radioactive contamination to a constant level over a significant area of 
land. 
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2. Need for a Easily Deliverable Device: The adversary seeks an RDD 
design that can be delivered reliably from a remote location.  An RDD 
fitting this criteria is typically small in size, light in weight, and can 
be detonated remotely, by a timing device, or through a proximity 
sensor.  Likely delivery methods include rockets or mortars. 
 
3. Need for IAEA Category 1 Source: The adversary requires a 
radioactive source with an activity greater than 1,000 Curies that 
would be fatal to humans after minutes of exposure.
14
   
 
4. Desire to Settle for a Crude Device: The adversary’s motivation for 
RDD usage could be met by a large, unwieldy, and poorly designed 
RDD.  This type of device would likely produce few radioactive 
injuries, but would still incite panic among the local population. 
 
 
Fig 4. Depiction of how to incorporate motivations into pathway decisions. 
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Device intentions significantly affect the adversary’s eventual pathway.   A need 
for even dispersal primarily influences the amount of source processing an adversary 
will attempt.  The need for an easily deliverable device influences delivery method, 
explosive type, and eventual device weight.  This device intention is heavily weighted 
towards those adversaries attempting to redress conventional military asymmetry or 
waging war on nations.  A need for an IAEA category 1 source solely affects the 
radioactive material portion of the network.  A desire to settle for a crude device affects 
all portions of the network, including the overall probability of success. 
 
Radioactive Material Acquisition 
 Radioactive material acquisition represents the largest and most complex portion 
of the developed RDD acquisition network.  It is the lynchpin of successful plot 
completion, and thus the likely place where the adversary can be most easily stopped.  
An adversary cannot detonate an RDD without successful navigation of the radioactive 
material acquisition pathways.  The purpose of this portion of the network is to represent 
possible methods of obtaining a radioactive source for utilization in an RDD.  Millions 
of radioactive source are utilized daily in devices across the globe.  It is impossible to 
characterize each radioactive source.  The majority of these sources have low activities 
that negate their effectiveness as a radiological weapon.  However, radiological sources 
of RDD concern can generally be obtained through six separate pathways: medical 
facility sources, irradiation facility sources, radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) 
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sources, industrial use sources, commercial acquisition of sources (legal purchase), and 
the interdiction of sources during transport. 
 Medical facilities represent one of the more likely locations for radioactive 
source theft for use in an RDD.  Most medical sources have an intermediate source 
strength of 1,000 to 20,000 Curies and are often constructed on mobile platforms for 
easy transportation
1
.  Teletherapy devices utilize 
60
Co and 
137
Cs to kill cancerous tumors 
inside the body.  The radioactivity level for these sources generally varies between 3,000 
and 15,000 Curies.
15
  The source is comprised of multiple 2.0 cm diameter pellets plated 
with nickel.
1
  Blood irradiators utilize a 
137
Cs source to sterilize blood prior to 
transfusion.  The source strength is approximately 5,000 Curies.  Blood irradiators are 
about the size of a filing cabinet, and are often made highly mobile.  Over 1,000 of these 
machines may exist in the world.
15
  The 
137
Cs within blood irradiation sources is of 
particular concern since the cesium is already present in a readily dispersible powder.    
Brachytherapy involves the precise placement of sealed radioactive sources inside or 
adjacent to tumors within the body.  These sources are typically of a lesser strength than 
other medicinal sources; however, their small size would make them attractive for theft.  
Radioisotope cows utilize 
99
Mo to produce a continuous supply of 
99m
Tc.  
99m
Tc, along 
with other isotopes of iodine, is frequently utilized as tracers within the body to diagnose 
potential ailments. 
The relatively secure and immobile radioactive sources used in sterilization 
procedures represent less of an RDD threat than medicinal sources, but their high 
radiation levels make them an extremely valuable target.  Hundreds of food and medical 
20 
 
 
supply sterilization facilities are located across the globe.  The 
60
Co sources within these 
facilities range from 100,000 to 5 million Curies.  The actual source is composed of 
hundreds of individual 
60
Co pencils.
15
  The high source strength of these irradiators 
requires a large amount of shielding, and they are normally kept underwater for storage 
when the facility is not in operation.  Consequently, an adversary would be required to 
raise the irradiator from the cooling pond prior to theft.  Additionally, without a 
significant amount of shielding, any thief would likely receive a lethal dose of radiation 
prior to exiting the facility with the source. 
Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) were manufactured by the former 
Soviet Union and the United States to provide electricity in remote areas.  The highest 
concentration of Soviet RTGs were utilized in the Arctic Circle, Far East, and Baltic 
Region to power remote electronic devices and lighthouses and over 1,000 were 
produced.
15
  RTGs represent a particular RDD concern because many were lost after the 
fall of the Soviet Union and few records detail their locations.  In addition, most have 
exceeded their engineered lifetime.  RTGs typically use 
90
Sr with a source strength 
between 4,000 to 400,000 Curies.  They may weigh anywhere from 80 pounds to two 
tons.
1
  Although the entire RTG unit is not exceptionally mobile, scrap metal scavengers 
have succeeded in removing the actual source. 
Wide ranges of radioactive sources are used in various industrial processes.  
Radiography sources are utilized to scan materials and determine the integrity of welds.  
These devices are always mobile, sometimes shielded, and may utilize 
137
Cs, 
60
Co, or 
192
Ir.
15
  Personnel unfamiliar with radiation and at remote construction sites often use 
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radiography, and it is not uncommon for a source to be lost at a work site or found in the 
bed of a stolen pickup truck.
15
  Well-logging sources represent another RDD threat in the 
industrial use field.  Containing a 
137
Cs source in the 15-20 Ci range and an americium-
beryllium neutron source for activation analysis, over 10,000 of these devices are in use 
across the globe.
15
  These devices are exceptionally mobile and are commonly 
transported between petroleum drilling sites by untrained hands.  Gauge and 
luminescence sources represent the final threats.  Gauges utilize radioactive sources to 
measure ambient conditions such as humidity, but the source strength is minimal. 
The possibility exists that an adversary could attempt to purchase a radioactive 
source legitimately through commercial means.  In fact, an investigative team from the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) successfully obtained a specific source 
license for a bogus company existing only on paper in 2007.  They were then able to 
enter into agreements with radioactive material suppliers to purchase enough 
241
Am to 
reach an IAEA category 3 level source.
16
  Strict measures have been enacted by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and self-regulating agreement states to close 
this loophole.  The issuance of licenses for large amounts of radioactive material must be 
accompanied by inspections to the site where the radioactive material is to be stored.  
However, a well-funded adversary, posing with a legitimate front company, may still be 
able to purchase a large radioactive source and divert it for RDD usage. 
The final pathway for radioactive material acquisition includes the interdiction of 
a radioactive source during shipment.  Radioactive sources are frequently shipped via 
land and ocean freight from source supplies to sources consumers.  Large food and 
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medical supply irradiators must be refueled twice a year.  This constant stream of 
radioactive source shipments across the country, coupled with the fact that only a 
handful of companies actually supply radioactive materials, means that an adversary 
could have a reasonable chance of interdicting a shipment.  The shipment of radioactive 
sources in large, protective flasks by companies such as MDS Nordion and REVISS 
helps to counter this threat; however, collusion with employees of source manufacturers 
and source carriers remains a significant concern. 
 
Weaponization 
 Weaponization of the radioactive materials used in an RDD presents a 
complicated set of pathways that an adversary may or may not choose to pursue.  Unlike 
the acquisition of radioactive materials, which is rather straightforward due to public 
knowledge on the uses, locations, and types of commercially available sources, 
processing of radioactive sources can be approached from numerous directions.  Based 
on the knowledge, technical capability, and funding of the adversary, processing of the 
radioactive material would allow an RDD to inflict significant human casualties and 
almost certainly disastrous economic consequences.  
Processing of a source for RDD use would first consider the type of radiation 
emitted from the particular isotope within the source.  The gamma rays emitted by 
sources such as 
137
Cs and 
60
Co are highly penetrating and pose an external exposure 
hazard to humans.  On the other hand, the alpha particles emitted by sources such as 
241
Am and 
238
Pu cannot penetrate the skin and must be inhaled, ingested, or absorbed 
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into the blood through an open wound.  Because of these characteristics, sources used in 
medicinal and industrial fields are fabricated into physical forms that are not inherently 
expedient to easy dispersal.  Gamma ray sources are typically cast into relatively large, 
solid pieces of metal.  For example, 
60
Co is formed into pencil shapes.  
137
Cs, on the 
other hand, is manufactured into a white powder.  Alpha emitters are commonly cast into 
solids or sealed into metallic containers that prevent the material from escaping and 
posing ingestion or inhalation hazards.   
Explosives attached to a pencil of 
60
Co would do little more than propel the 
source away from the detonation.  While an exposure hazard would be present near the 
source, human casualties due to radiation would be minimal.  Fragmenting the source 
into many shards or pellets prior to detonation would increase radiation exposure and 
spread material over a much larger area; however, the radiation danger would cease as 
the population exits the blast site.  A third method of processing, and certainly the most 
dangerous, would grind the source into a powder with the goal of creating a persistent 
radioactive cloud.  This cloud would be carried by wind and air currents away from the 
blast site and towards other population areas.  Any humans exposed to the cloud would 
inhale the radioactive particles, which would become lodged in the body.  Human 
casualties due to radiation, based on cloud movement, may be catastrophic. 
 Another aspect of the weaponization portion of the network includes obtaining 
shielding.  Shielding serves two purposes.  First, shielding would protect the adversaries 
from the radioactive emissions of the source while they construct the device.  Previous 
RDD studies suggest that a device carrying 10,000 Curies of gamma ray radiation would 
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need roughly 310 pounds of lead shielding to protect those handling the device.
17
  Based 
on the ultimate motivations and resources available to an adversary, they may or may not 
be concerned about self-protection.  Secondly, shielding may be needed to block 
radioactive emissions from reaching radiation detectors installed in the target area.  
Large cities, government installations, military bases, and sporting events all have 
radiation detectors to prevent RDD attacks or detect the smuggling of nuclear weapons.  
The need for shielding is also dependent upon the type of radioactive material obtained.  
For example, a large amount of lead shielding is not necessary to stop weakly-
penetrating alpha particles from certain sources.  The presence of shielding would be 
more likely for highly-penetrating sources emitting gamma rays. 
  
Assembly and Detonation 
 The final portion of the network considers various means a terrorist organization 
would take to disperse a radioactive source. Various combinations of high explosive, 
low explosive, and incendiary methods are included.  The use of high explosives 
represents the most likely pathway; however, low explosives and incendiary methods 
would increase source vaporization and likelihood of inhalation.  Each explosive 
pathway is split into specific subsets that, when integrated with real-time intelligence, 
can suggest which pathway an organization is pursuing towards the completion of an 
RDD.  For example, Najibullah Zazi’s search for an explosive based on oxidizer and fuel 
combinations was flagged by his scouring for hydrogen peroxide and nail polish 
remover in beauty supply stores during September of 2009.
18
  Additionally, the 
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explosive method chosen may depend on the specific radioactive source obtained.  A 
pathway involving the dispersal of an unprocessed alpha emitter such as 
241
Am would be 
weighted towards incendiary explosives to fully vaporize the weakly penetrating but 
highly-damaging alpha particles. 
This portion of the network also considers delivery and detonation methods.  
Delivery nodes include vehicles, projectiles, and hand-carried methods.  The inclusion of 
delivery and detonation methods is important to a pathways analysis of an RDD 
acquisition network since the chosen methods are likely dependent on previous paths the 
terrorist organization has taken.  Terrorists utilizing an alpha emitter ground into small 
diameter particles might choose to use a timed projectile that detonates over a highly 
populated area.  For a strong gamma emitter, the usage of a truck would allow for a 
greater amount of explosives to spread radiation over a wider area.  Terrorists and 
insurgents in today’s conflicts have demonstrated their aptitude at constructing highly 
effective explosive devices from crude and unconventional materials, and successful 
completion of these final nodes will ensure a successful RDD detonation. 
  
Final Device Probabilities and Characteristics 
 The final portion of the network includes nodes that detail the adversary’s chance 
of success and provide an overview of likely RDD characteristics.  This portion of the 
network does not represent specific actions or decisions as in the previous four portions.  
Instead, these nodes provide the overall outcome of the pathways chosen.  Four of these 
nodes provide overall chances of success for each of the four network tasks.  They are 
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motivation to attempt an RDD attack, capability to obtain radioactive material, capability 
to weaponize the radioactive source, and capability to assemble and detonate the device.  
Next, these four probabilities are integrated to provide a final overall chance of success 
for a given plot.  Each of the component probabilities does not uniformly contribute to 
the overall chance of success.  The final outcome is heavily weighted towards the 
success of obtaining radioactive material.  Furthermore, a low probability of successfully 
weaponizing the obtained source has little effect on the overall chance of success. 
  Three characteristics of the RDD are inferred from the adversary’s path through 
the network.  The inclusion of these nodes aids in identifying how specific actions by the 
adversary may eventually affect the outcome of a successfully acquired RDD.  The three 
characteristics are device weight, overall danger from radioactive exposure, and overall 
panic inducing capability.  Device weight is determined from the type of radioactive 
material acquired, the presence of shielding, the type of explosives, and the delivery 
method.  A predicted device weight provides law enforcement agencies with a physical 
quantification of the suspected RDD.  This information can be used to determine the size 
of the RDD, how many people would be needed to move such an item, and how feasibly 
the RDD can be delivered to various targets.  A prediction of the overall danger from 
radioactive exposure should allow law enforcement to tailor their response prior to an 
RDD detonation, or better augment a response to an already detonated device.  The 
various pathways to successful RDD acquisition imply that the danger from radioactive 
exposure is certainly not constant across different RDD designs.   
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Finally, a prediction of the overall panic inducing capability provides a measure 
of the level of fear and chaos the RDD will incite among the target population.  Unlike 
many aspects of the produced network, this node is not influenced by the type of 
radioactive material utilized in the device or the level of source processing.  The 
situation immediately after an RDD detonation is likely to be extremely hectic.  
Depending on the location of the detonation, and the use of any previously installed 
radiation detectors, the presence of radioactive materials might be detected within 
minutes to hours after the initial explosion.  Initial panic induced by the RDD would 
likely be due to the delivery method and the type and amount of explosives used.  
Eventually, the panic level would increase as authorities release information detailing 
the presence of radioactive materials.  Due to the general public’s perception of 
radiation, this fear and panic is likely to be independent of the type of radioactive 
material released.  Consequently, the node predicting the panic inducing capability of a 
successful RDD plot is mainly influenced by type of delivery method and the type of 
explosives. 
 
Adversary Inputs 
 The inclusion of information about the capabilities and resources of a particular 
adversary allow for the network to be customized to a specific RDD threat.  Pathways 
chosen by the adversary and eventual chance of plot success are inherently dependent on 
the capabilities of the organization.  The three adversary inputs are tactical capabilities, 
technical capabilities, and funding. 
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Tactical Capabilities 
 The first input judges an adversary’s tactical capabilities.  Tactical capabilities 
include access to weapons, intelligence and surveillance abilities, and military type 
training.  The level of tactical capability solely affects the radioactive material 
acquisition portion of the network.  A tactically capable adversary is better suited to 
acquire radioactive material by penetrating facilities and stealing sources.  On the other 
hand, an adversary with little tactical capability is more likely to attempt commercial 
acquisition of a radioactive source.  This input includes three levels of tactical capability: 
 
1. Novice: Access to no firearms or a small number of handguns.  No 
surveillance or intelligence capabilities.  No military training. 
 
2. Criminal: Access to a moderate number of handguns, shotguns, and semi-
automatic rifles.  Ability to conduct covert surveillance on facilities 
containing radioactive materials.  Ability to utilize open source information 
to develop targeting plans and exploit weak points of radioactive source 
containing facilities.   Moderately trained in firearms usage.  Capable of 
performing violent acts on par with organized, gang-related crimes. 
 
3. Paramilitary: Access to a large number of handguns and automatic rifles.  
Access to a small number of rocket-propelled grenade launchers and small-
caliber indirect fire weapons.  Ability to conduct detailed surveillance and 
29 
 
 
collect specific intelligence about radioactive source security.  Highly trained 
in firearms usage.  Capable of implementing coordinated small-unit tactics. 
 
Technical Capabilities 
 The second input judges an adversary’s technical capabilities.  Technical 
capabilities are both a function of education level and presence of laboratory facilities.  
This input mainly affects an adversary’s ability to process a radioactive source.  
However, advanced technical capabilities also increase the success an adversary may 
have in commercially acquiring a source.  Advanced laboratory facilities may allow an 
adversary to pass a regulating inspection and obtain a license to purchase radioactive 
sources.  An adversary’s technical capability is judged by determining which of the 
available laboratory facilities most closely match the adversary’s education level and 
technical facilities.  For example, the capabilities of a high school laboratory would be 
equivalent to an adversary with a high school education and a poorly equipped 
laboratory facility.  Technical capabilities are added into the network by equating the 
adversary to one of seven possible laboratory types: 
 
1. No Technical Capabilities: No formal education.  No laboratory facilities or 
processing equipment. 
 
2. Garage Laboratory: Average adversary education level is high school or less.  
Rudimentary laboratory only containing hand tools. 
30 
 
 
 
3. High School Laboratory: Average adversary education is at the high school 
level.  Poorly equipped laboratory containing hand tools, poor electronic 
equipment, and a minimal chemistry capability. 
 
4. University Laboratory: Average adversary education is at the bachelor degree 
level.  Well equipped laboratory containing hand tools, moderate electronic 
equipment, moderate chemistry capability, moderate fume hood processing 
capability, and a moderate amount of precise measuring devices. 
 
5. Undeveloped Government Laboratory: Average adversary education is at the 
master degree level.  Well equipped laboratory containing hand tools, 
moderate electronic equipment, advanced chemistry capability, advanced 
fume hood processing capability, and a moderate amount of precise 
measuring devices. 
 
6. Technical Corporation Laboratory: Average adversary education is at the 
PhD level.  Well equipped laboratory containing hand tools, advanced 
electronic equipment, advanced chemistry capability, advanced fume hood 
processing capability, and an advanced level of precise measuring devices. 
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7. Developed Government Laboratory: Average adversary education is at the 
PhD level with decades of experience.  Well equipped laboratory containing 
hand tools, the most advanced electronic equipment, the most advanced 
chemistry capability, the most advanced fume hood processing capability, 
and the most advanced level of precise measuring devices. 
 
Funding 
 The third input judges an adversary’s level of funding.  It is important to note 
that the level of funding represents the amount of money the adversary is willing to 
devote to the RDD plot.  A well-funded adversary who devotes minimal funding to an 
RDD plot would have little chance of success.  The level of funding significantly affects 
all portions of the network.  Sufficient funding permits an adversary to purchase 
resources in order to steal radioactive materials from various facilities.  Also, funding 
could be utilized to purchase facility intelligence or to bribe an insider to collude either 
passively or actively.  The possibility of commercial acquisition of radioactive materials 
also becomes more likely with a large amount of funding.  Commercial acquisition 
would likely require thousands of dollars to purchase a source license and hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to purchase a high activity source.  Funding also affects the type of 
explosives available to the adversary.  A small amount of funding may require the 
adversary to construct homemade explosive mixtures from ammonium nitrate or 
chlorates.  On the other hand, a well-funded adversary could purchase military grade 
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explosives.  Finally, funding permits the purchase of more advanced delivery systems 
and RDD detonation components.  The input for funding presents eight choices: 
 
1. $1,000 
2. $10,000 
3. $50,000 
4. $100,000 
5. $250,000 
6. $500,000 
7. $1,000,000 
8. $2,000,000 
 
A general overview of the network’s construction can be seen in Fig. 5. 
The top row of the figure depicts adversary motivations and adversary characteristics.  
Both of these inputs are utilized to characterize various adversaries.  Adversary 
characteristics includes tactical capabilities, technical capabilities, and funding.  The 
group of green boxes represent various tasks the adversary must complete to 
successfully detonate an RDD.  These include radioactive material acquisition, source 
weaponization, and assembly and detonation.  It is important to note that one pathway in 
Fig. 5 bypasses source weaponization.  This represents the fact that this step is not 
mandatory to successfully acquire an RDD.  The orange box represents the final outputs 
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of the created network.  These outputs include device characteristics and success 
probabilities. 
 
Fig. 5. General overview of the network’s construction. 
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Bayesian Analysis 
 Bayesian networks, or belief networks, are a method of understanding 
probabilistic models.  What makes Bayesian networks unique as a probabilistic 
modeling tool, however, is the fact they can account for prior probabilities when 
determining the likelihood of an action, decision, or outcome occurring.
 19
  A Bayesian 
network, when modeling an interconnected system, can have its beliefs updated as more 
information is added.  Consequently, the ultimate effect of a small system change can 
easily be determined.  Bayesian analyses are valid in all probabilistic interpretations; 
however, they are frequently used in science and engineering.
20
  The most prevalent use 
of Bayesian networks occurs in analytical medical diagnostics.
21
   
The central concept of a Bayesian network is Bayes’ Theorem.22  Thomas Bayes 
was an eighteenth century clergyman who surmised that so-called conditional 
probabilities could account for the effects of prior evidence in a network.  Let iA  denote 
one of n events, and E  be some evidence about the network;  then, Bayes’ theory can be 
written as: 
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(1) 
where )( EAP i  is the probability of iA  given E , )( iAP  is the prior probability of iA , 
and )( iAEP  is the conditional probability of E  when iA   is true.
23
   
An article entitled ―The Use of Bayesian Networks in Decision-Making‖ 
appearing in Key Topics in Surgical Research and Methodology presents a common 
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example used to illustrate Bayesian analysis.
23
  This example analyzes how the addition 
of evidence, in the form of an x-ray scan, changes the probability that a patient has 
tuberculosis.  Initial diagnosis by the doctor suggests that the patient has a 30% chance 
of having tuberculosis.  This 30% probability represents the prior probability, or )( iAP   
in Eq. 1.  Next, the doctor calls for an x-ray scan to help confirm or deny the condition.  
Previous experience shows that an abnormal x-ray is observed in 90% of patients with 
tuberculosis and 10% of patients without tuberculosis.  As expected, an abnormal x-ray 
does not conclusively prove a patient has tuberculosis, and a normal x-ray does not 
conclusively prove a patient does not have tuberculosis.  A conditional probability table 
can then be written to show this data.  Table I shows the conditional probability table for 
the diagnosis of tuberculosis with an x-ray. 
 
TABLE I 
Conditional probability table for the diagnosis of tuberculosis with an x-ray. 
 
X-ray Tuberculosis Present (%) Tuberculosis Absent (%) 
Normal 10 90 
Abnormal 90 10 
 
  
 Bayesian analysis and the conditional probability table aid in quantifying the 
effect of adding evidence for the x-ray.  Assume that the doctor finds the x-ray is 
normal.  Intuitively, the doctor knows that the patient’s chance of having tuberculosis 
has dropped below the prior 30% diagnosis with the evidence of a normal x-ray.  
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However, what is the actual chance?  Bayes’ Theorem says that the probability of 
tuberculosis, given a normal x-ray result and a 30% prior probability, is only 4.54%: 
 
%100
))90.070.0()10.030.0((
)10.030.0(
%54.4 


  
(2) 
Equation 2 demonstrates the calculation of the new probability through the use of Eq. 1.  
This quantification ability of Bayesian networks has far-reaching consequences.  The 
benefit to medical fields is readily apparent.  Often, it’s much more comforting for a 
patient to hear the doctor quantify their diagnosis with a small probability.  In a 
complicated medical situation, the integration of medical test evidence and symptoms in 
a Bayesian network can provide a simple diagnosis that may be beyond the qualitative 
capabilities of the diagnosing doctor.  While medicine pioneered the use of Bayesian 
analysis, many mathematical, scientific, and defense fields are adopting this flexible 
tool. 
A Bayesian analysis is an ideal method to develop an intelligence tool analyzing 
the acquisition of RDDs for three reasons.  First, Bayesian analysis can be performed on 
complex networks with thousands of nodes.  These networks can be constructed to 
provide an overall probability of success for a complex action or decision.  
Consequently, Bayesian analysis of RDD acquisition allows for analysts to derive an 
overall chance of plot success based on inputs describing the adversary.  Without a 
Bayesian approach, an analysis of this type would be complicated and time consuming.   
Secondly, Bayesian networks can integrate evidence and accomplish the difficult 
task of instantaneously updating all probabilities across the network.  Types of evidence 
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about an RDD plot are numerous.  Untrained analysts may not recognize how certain 
evidence affects various portions of the network.  Thus, an accurate Bayesian analysis of 
RDD acquisitions would allow analysts to concentrate on assessing the actual threat, 
rather than attempting to determine how specific evidence affects the network.   
Finally, a Bayesian analysis of RDD acquisitions can provide signals or flags that 
allow law enforcement agencies to focus their efforts on stopping the threat.  The 
addition of evidence into a Bayesian network instantly updates all other probabilities 
within the network.  For example, evidence about a certain radioactive material 
acquisition may change the probability that an adversary will attempt to obtain a certain 
type of homemade explosive.  This information can be shared with law enforcement 
agencies, who can scour sources for the ingredients of the homemade explosive.  These 
signals, or plot flags, facilitate the focusing of a small number of resources in a limited 
timeframe. 
  A Bayesian network analysis of RDD acquisitions does have a few downsides.  
All calculations performed in the updating of a Bayesian network are derived from 
conditional probability tables programmed into the network.  Consequently, any results 
derived from the network are only as good as the coded conditional probabilities.  Case 
studies are utilized to rectify these potential uncertainties.  By analyzing case studies 
with expected answers, the conditional probabilities can be adjusted until the network 
provides the expected results.  Once the Bayesian network results have been vetted and 
the conditional probabilities adjusted, it can then be used to analyze potential or current 
RDD acquisition plots with some degree of confidence. 
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Netica 
Many software packages are available to build and analyze Bayesian networks.  
On such package, called Netica, was utilized to perform the Bayesian network analysis 
of RDD acquisitions presented in this work.  Netica boasts a user-friendly graphical 
interface and an ability to perform complex sensitivity analyses.
24
  Additionally, Netica 
allows the inclusion of special constant nodes within a Bayesian network.  These nodes 
have no associated conditional probabilities.  Instead, their constant values can be called 
on to influence other nodes within the network.  By adjusting the constant node’s value 
to reflect characteristics of an adversary, a few simple clicks can quickly adjust a 
Bayesian network to permit analysis of RDD plots by various adversaries.  Other 
Bayesian analysis software excludes this key feature so vital to an effective RDD 
acquisition analysis.   
 
“Asia” Example Network 
The Netica software package includes a sampling of example Bayesian networks 
as tutorials.  The most popular example Bayesian network is named ―Asia‖ and is shown 
in Fig. 6.  ―Asia‖ is a simple tool used to diagnose a lung condition.  The analysis of this 
simple Bayesian network is a useful exercise before attempting to understand the 
complex network depicting RDD acquisitions.  Individual network nodes in Netica are 
depicted as yellow rectangles.  Nodes are given a title and any number of states.  In 
―Asia‖, each node has only two states.  Each state is a possible outcome of the 
observation described by the node’s title.  For example, the node ―Smoking‖ includes the 
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two states ―Smoker‖ and ―NonSmoker.‖  Each node also shows the probability of each 
state being true.  ―Asia‖ assumes that, without the addition of any evidence, a patient has 
a 50% chance of being a smoker.  The black lines connecting the nodes are called links.  
The arrow of the link points from the parent node to the child node.  Consequently, the 
node ―Visit To Asia‖ is a parent of ―Tuberculosis‖ and the node ―Smoking‖ is a parent 
of both ―Lung Cancer‖ and ―Bronchitis.‖  This parent-child relationship depicts how the 
nodes interact with each other.  A visit to Asia affects the chance of a patient having 
tuberculosis.  On the other hand, smoking affects the chance of a patient having either 
lung cancer or bronchitis.  Parent nodes affect their children, their children’s children, 
and so on.  Parent nodes do not directly affect other parents of their children.  Evidence 
of high pollution will increase the chance of lung cancer.  However, evidence of high 
pollution will not directly affect the chance that the patient smokes. 
 
 
Fig. 6. ―Asia‖ Bayesian network provided as an example within Netica. 
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The nodes within ―Asia‖ are organized into risk factors, conditions, and 
symptoms.  The top row of nodes represent risk factors (―Visit to Asia,‖ ―Pollution,‖ and 
―Smoking‖), the second row represents possible conditions (―Tuberculosis,‖ ―Lung 
Cancer,‖ and ―Bronchitis‖), the third row represents a combination of conditions 
(―Tuberculosis or Cancer‖), and the bottom row represents observable symptoms or 
evidence (―XRay Result‖ and ―Dyspnea‖).  Analysis of the ―Asia‖ network informs 
doctors of likely patient conditions based on available evidence.  The default network 
risk factors are a 1.0% chance of a visit to Asia, a 90% chance of low pollution, and a 
50% chance of smoking.  These risk factors contribute to a 1.04% chance of 
tuberculosis, a 5.8% chance of lung cancer, and a 45% chance of bronchitis.   
  
 
Fig. 7. ―Asia‖ network with the addition of evidence for a smoker with an abnormal X-
ray. 
 
41 
 
 
 The use of ―Asia‖ as a static probability model is helpful in predicting the chance 
of disease based on constant probabilities.  However, the addition of evidence to ―Asia‖ 
demonstrates how Bayesian networks can be used as dynamic tools to model various 
situations.  Figure 7 depicts ―Asia‖ with the addition of two pieces of evidence.  Imagine 
a patient has entered the clinic with chest pain.  The patient is a smoker.  To gather more 
information, the doctor orders an x-ray and the results are abnormal.  These two pieces 
of information are then entered into ―Asia.‖  Netica displays the addition of evidence 
into nodes by changing their color to gray.  Notice that the nodes ―Smoking‖ and ―XRay 
Result‖ have turned gray and the respective smoker and abnormal states now read a 
100% probability.  This evidence suggests that the patient has a 6.52% chance of 
tuberculosis, a 65.8% chance of lung cancer, and a 60% chance of bronchitis.  As 
expected, evidence of smoking and an abnormal x-ray significantly increase the chance 
of lung cancer.  The chance of tuberculosis remains relatively low, since its parent has 
not changed.  However, the chance of tuberculosis did increase from 1.04% to 6.52% 
due to the evidence of an abnormal x-ray.   
 The authors of ―The Use of Bayesian Networks in Decision-Making‖ suggest 
investigating the addition of evidence to the ―Asia‖ network through the use of a 
cumulative belief curve.
23
  A cumulative belief curve is constructed by adding evidence 
subsequently to the network and analyzing the effect on a specific node.  An analysis of 
the risk of lung cancer as evidence of smoking, dyspnea, an abnormal x-ray, and a visit 
to Asia are added to the network is seen in Fig. 8.  The figure depicts the expected result 
of a 5.8% chance of lung cancer with no evidence added to network.  However, with the 
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cumulative addition of smoking, dyspnea, and an abnormal x-ray, the chance of lung 
cancer grows to 10.5%, 15.5%, and 73.4%, respectively.  The final evidence of a visit to 
Asia has a startling effect.  The risk of lung cancer actually decreases to 59.2%.  How 
can this be since a visit to Asia has no link to lung cancer?  This occurs since a visit to 
Asia increases the chance of tuberculosis.  The resulting increase in the chance of 
tuberculosis provides an alternate explanation for the evidence of an abnormal x-ray and 
dyspnea.  This subsequently decreases the chance of lung cancer.  Fig. 8 demonstrates 
that while a parent cannot directly affect another parent of its child, it can have an 
indirect effect upon the addition of evidence into the network.  This has important 
implications for more complicated Bayesian networks, such as the one created for this 
work to model RDD acquisitions.  Introduction of evidence for a certain RDD pathway 
will decrease the likelihood of other pathways.  This effect epitomizes the utility of a 
Bayesian analysis approach to RDD acquisitions. 
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Fig. 8. Cumulative belief curve of risk of lung cancer based according to ―Asia‖. 
 
 
Constant Nodes 
 Constant nodes provide values that can be utilized by all nodes within a Netica 
Bayesian network.  Unlike other nodes within the network, constant nodes are unlinked 
and do not change as evidence is added.  Constant nodes are deterministic in the fact that 
they can have only one active state at a time.  However, the user can easily switch 
between states when desired.  As the state is switched, all nodes that utilize the value 
embedded in the constant node will adjust.  This property facilitates the flexibility that 
allows a Bayesian analysis of RDD acquisitions to analyze different adversaries and 
plots with minimal user input.  Three constant nodes are utilized in the constructed RDD 
5.8
10.5
15.5
73.4
59.2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
No Evidence Smoking Dyspnea Abnormal X-
ray
Visit to Asia
R
is
k
 o
f 
L
u
n
g
 C
an
ce
r 
(%
)
Cumulative Evidence
44 
 
 
acquisition network to describe the three adversary inputs previously described: tactical 
capabilities, technical capabilities, and funding. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Constant node used to describe available adversary funding. 
 
 Figure 9 depicts a constant node used to describe the funding available to an 
adversary’s RDD plot.  The actual constant node is the smooth-cornered rectangle with 
the title ―Funding.‖  Below the constant node is a deterministic node linked to the 
constant node’s value.  This node is merely included to indicate to the user the current 
state of the constant node.  As shown in Fig. 9, this constant node is currently set to a 
state that describes a funding level of $1,000.  Figure 10 displays the properties of the 
constant node.  The text box shows that this constant node has eight separate states.  
Each of these states corresponds to a level of plot funding: $1,000, $10,000, $50,000, 
$100,000, $250,000, $500,000, $1,000,000, and $2,000,000.  These states are assigned a 
respective value, varying from 0.05 for the $1,000 state to 1 for the $2,000,000 state.   
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When a constant node is called from within the network to calculate a node’s 
probabilities, the value corresponding to the constant node’s current state will be used.  
For example, this constant node is utilized within the RDD acquisition network to 
determine the likelihood of an adversary obtaining radioactive material through 
commercial acquisition.  If the constant node is set to $1,000, representing a poorly-
funded adversary, a value of 0.05 will be used in an equation to calculate a low 
probability of commercial acquisition.  On the other hand, if the constant node is set to 
$2,000,000, representing a well-funded adversary, a value of 1 will be used in an 
equation to calculate a much higher probability of commercial acquisition.  With the 
establishment of a constant node and a respective value for each state, probabilities 
within the network can be fine tuned by changing the equation that calls the constant 
node’s value.  The use of equations to calculate probabilities is discussed in the 
following section.   
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Fig. 10. State values of the ―Funding‖ constant node. 
 
Conditional Probability Tables 
 Netica updates the node probabilities within a Bayesian network by utilizing 
conditional probability tables entered by the user.  Conditional probability tables are also 
called truth tables.  These tables are not unlike the crude example shown in Table I 
depicting the presence of tuberculosis from the result of an x-ray.  Netica allows two 
methods of constructing truth tables.  The first method involves entering each 
conditional probability individually.  This is an easy process for a simple truth table like 
the one presented in Table I.  However, for nodes with multiple parents, the number of 
entries in the truth table increases into the thousands.  This makes cell-by-cell entry 
infeasible.  The second method permitted by Netica is the use of Boolean logic 
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equations.  After a logic equation is written into a node’s properties, Netica 
automatically calculates each entry in the truth table.  This method makes short work of 
an otherwise unwieldy task that could take years to accomplish by hand. 
 Truth table construction by hand will be demonstrated by using examples from 
the RDD acquisition network constructed in Netica.  Figure 11 depicts a small portion of 
the network including nodes that account for evidence of an adversary obtaining 
thermite to utilize in an RDD.  The ―Thermite Purchased‖ and ―Thermite Stolen‖ nodes 
represent specific actions that the adversary can perform.  Both of these nodes indicate 
evidence that the adversary is attempting to utilize thermite.  The ―Thermite Evidence‖ 
node is the parent of the two evidence nodes, and serves to represent the overall 
evidence of thermite.  Finally, the ―Incendiary Device Type‖ node is a parent of the 
―Thermite Evidence‖ node and the ―Pryophoric Evidence‖ node (not shown).  This node 
serves to represent which type of incendiary device (either thermite or pyrophoric) is 
most likely.  The state labeled ―none‖ represents the fact that another explosive type is 
currently more likely than an incendiary device. 
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Fig. 11. Nodes depicting evidence of thermite as an incendiary device type. 
 
 The truth table governing the calculation of the ―Thermite Evidence‖ node is 
seen in Fig. 12.  By right-clicking on the node within Netica and selecting ―Table…‖ the 
truth table can be adjusted in a similar fashion to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  The 
column on the left is titled ―Incendiary Device Type‖ and lists the three states of that 
node.  This node is the parent of the ―Thermite Evidence‖ node, and parent nodes will 
always appear in this column while editing truth tables.  Cells containing numbers in 
Fig. 12 show how the ―Incendiary Device Type‖ node is affected by the ―Incendiary 
Evidence‖ node.  A ―True‖ state of the ―Incendiary Evidence‖ node will result in a 
―Thermite‖ state 98% of the time.  A ―False‖ state will result in a ―Thermite‖ state only 
2% of the time.  On the other hand, a ―False‖ state in the ―Thermite Evidence‖ node will 
result in a ―Pyrophoric‖ and ―None‖ state 98% of the time.  These probabilities ensure 
that evidence of a thermite device correctly affects the proper state of the ―Incendiary 
Device Type‖ node.  Like the example presented in Fig. 12, most evidence nodes within 
the RDD network are linked to their parents probabilistically instead of 
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deterministically.  Generally, a deterministic relationship places too much emphasis on 
evidence nodes and can severely dampen other portions of the network when evidence is 
added. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. Truth table depicting evidence of thermite as an incendiary device type. 
 
 As previously mentioned above, truth tables can be calculated by Netica if the 
relationship between nodes is described by the user with Boolean logic equations.  This 
method is utilized if the truth table is complex, or if the node’s probabilities call on the 
value of a constant node.  Fig. 13 depicts a node within the constructed Bayesian 
network named ―Process Outcome.‖  This node characterizes the type of source 
processing performed by the adversary in the source weaponization portion of the 
network and includes four states: ―Solid,‖ ―Fragments,‖ ―Powder,‖ ―Solution,‖ and 
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―None.‖  The eight small circles seen in Fig. 13 are minimized nodes that call on 
constant values within the network.  The value in each of these nodes is calculated with a 
Boolean logic equation utilizing the currently selected value of the constant node.  This 
implementation allows the network to quickly adjust the values of certain nodes to 
reflect the characteristics and capabilities of various adversaries. 
 
 
Fig. 13. ―Process Outcome‖ node whose probabilities are calculated by a Boolean logic 
equation and constant nodes. 
 
 
Network Construction 
 A Bayesian network was constructed in Netica to analyze RDD acquisitions.  
The network includes 291 probability nodes describing the pathway to successful RDD 
construction and three constant nodes allowing for inputs describing the characteristics 
of the modeled adversary.  Additionally, the network is broken into five general sections: 
adversary inputs and motivations, radioactive material acquisition, source 
weaponization, assembly and detonation, and final RDD design characteristics and 
overall chance of success.  The entire network can be seen in Figs. 14 to Fig. 41. 
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Fig. 14. Overview of RDD acquisition network.
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Fig. 15. Overview of adversary inputs and motivations section. 
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Fig. 16. Adversary input portion of adversary inputs and motivations section. 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. Adversary motivation portion of adversary inputs and motivations section. 
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Fig. 18. Suspected target location portion of adversary inputs and motivations section.
 
 
  
 
5
5
 
 
 
Fig. 19. Overview of radioactive material acquisition section.
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Fig. 20. Medical facility portion of radioactive material acquisition section.
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Fig. 21. RTG portion of radioactive material acquisition section. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 22. Irradiation facility portion of radioactive material acquisition section. 
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Fig. 23. Commercial acquisition portion of radioactive material section.
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Fig. 24. Industrial use portion of radioactive material acquisition section.
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Fig. 25. Transport interdiction portion of radioactive material acquisition section.
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Fig. 26. Radioactive material summary portion of radioactive material acquisition 
section. 
 
 
  
 
6
2
 
 
 
Fig. 27. Overview of source weaponization section.
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Fig. 28. Source shielding portion of source weaponization section. 
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Fig. 29. Source processing portion of source weaponization section.
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Fig. 30. Source weaponization input portion of source weaponization section. 
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Fig. 31. Overview of assembly and detonation section. 
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Fig. 32. Overview of explosives portion of assembly and detonation section  
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Fig. 33. Incendiary device portion of assembly and detonation section. 
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Fig. 34. Low explosive portion of assembly and detonation section. 
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Fig. 35. High explosive portion of assembly and detonation section. 
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Fig. 36. Explosive summary portion of assembly and detonation section.
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Fig. 37. Delivery method portion of assembly and detonation section. 
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Fig. 38. Detonation portion of assembly and detonation section. 
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Fig. 39. Overview of final RDD design characteristics and overall chance of success section.
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Fig. 40. Final RDD design characteristics portion of RDD design characteristics and 
overall chance of success section.
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Fig. 41. Overall chance of success portion of RDD design characteristics and overall chance of success section. 
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CHAPTER III 
NETWORK VERIFICATION 
 A series of case studies was first analyzed in order to verify that the Bayesian 
RDD acquisition network operated as expected.  Additionally, these case studies serve to 
highlight many features of the network.  Some of these features include the addition and 
removal of evidence for certain acquisition pathways and the effect of changing the 
resources available to an adversary.  Also, two extreme case studies were analyzed to 
determine the limitations of this methodology.  It is important to note that the 
probabilities listed as results of the following case studies are not absolute.  Instead, they 
represent the relatively likelihood of success among various plots.  Also, these 
probabilities do not account for any interdiction efforts by law enforcement agencies.  
However, suggested interdiction efforts are highlighted when they present themselves 
within the analysis. 
 
Plot 1: Homegrown, Al-Qaeda Influenced Plot 
 The first case examined is a homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced RDD plot.  This 
plot can be considered analogous to the May 2010 attempted Times Square bombing by 
the Pakistani-American, Faisal Shahzad.
25
  Acting alone or in a small cell with no 
military experience and minimal Al-Qaeda connections, the adversaries have novice 
tactical capabilities, and technical capabilities equivalent to those found in a garage lab.  
Since a small amount of funding is provided by overseas Pakistan-based terrorist 
sources, the adversaries devote $10,000 to the plot.  The primary motivations are a 
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Jihadi-based religious imperative and a desire to cause mass chaos and devastation.  Fig. 
42 depicts the adversary inputs and motivations.  The two motivations suggest only a 
25.6% desire for even source dispersal, a 13.7% desire for an easily deliverable device, a 
92.1% desire to settle for a crude design, and only a 5.40% need of an IAEA category 1 
source.  These RDD characteristics are expected for a poorly funded plot primarily 
concerned with causing devastation in accordance with a religious imperative. 
 The predicted RDD plot characteristics are seen in Table II.  Analysis suggests 
that the adversary will attempt to obtain 
137
Cs from a device utilized in an industrial 
facility.  Radioactive sources in industrial facilities, such as well-logging devices or flow 
gauges, are typically less secured.  An adversary with little tactical capability would find 
these devices easier to steal than larger sources in well secured facilities.  Shielding 
would be included with a 47.8% probability as the activity of industrial sources is 
relatively low.  An adversary with few technical capabilities would only have a 32.2% 
chance of processing the source.  The low probability of source processing explains the 
use of an incendiary explosive to vaporize the source into an aerosol.  The RDD would 
be delivered with a motor vehicle and detonated by a suicide bomber.  The overall 
danger of the plot is predicted to be medium with a 35% probability due to low source 
activity and absence of source processing.  Use of explosives in a motor vehicle would 
have a high chance of inducing panic with a 38.9% probability.  Device weight is 
expected to be only 100 kg due to moderate source shielding. 
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Fig. 42. Inputs for homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced RDD plot. 
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TABLE II 
Homegrown Al-Qaeda influenced RDD plot characteristics. 
 
Plot Characteristics Network Output 
Radioactive Material Origin: Industrial Facility 
Radioactive Material Type: 
137
Cs 
Presence of Shielding: 47.8% 
Shielding Type: Steel 
Presence of Source Processing: 32.2% 
Source Processing Type: Solid 
Explosive Type: Incendiary (Thermite) 
Delivery Method: Motor Vehicle 
Detonation Type: Suicide 
Danger from Radioactive Material: Medium (35%) 
Capability to Induce Panic: High (38.9%) 
Device Weight: 100 kg 
 
 
The overall chance of success for such a plot is shown in Fig. 43.  Analysis 
shows the relative probability of success for a homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced RDD 
plot is only 12.4%.  Such an adversary would have a high motivation for undertaking an 
RDD attack, but few resources hamper the ability to obtain radioactive material and 
nearly nullify any chance of successful source weaponization. 
 
 
Fig. 43. Overall chance of success for a homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced RDD plot. 
81 
 
  
 
 
Effect of Evidence for Delivery Methods 
 This plot was examined by including evidence that the adversary had previously 
purchased a vehicle to be used in the attack.  Figure 44 depicts the effects of this 
evidence on the overall chance of success for the homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced plot.  
The evidence of a vehicle purchase increases the probability of successful assembly and 
detonation of the RDD from 79.4% to 80.9%.  Additionally, the inclusion of this 
evidence only increases the overall probability of success from 12.4% to 12.5%.  These 
results reflect the fact that obtaining a vehicle to deliver an RDD is not an inherently 
difficult task for an adversary.  However, it is interesting to note that the inclusion of this 
evidence increases likely device weight to 500 kg.  Evidence of a vehicle purchase 
further suggests that the device cannot be hand-carried or delivered remotely. 
 
 
 
Fig. 44. Overall chance of success for a homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced RDD plot 
with evidence of a vehicle purchase. 
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Effect of Evidence for Source Processing 
 Next, this plot was further examined by including evidence of a fume hood and 
metal grinder.  These devices indicate the presence of source processing.  Table III 
depicts the updated homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced RDD plot characteristics.  The 
probability of source processing has increased from 32.3% to 55.2%.  Presence of a 
fume hood and a metal grinder, along with the adversary’s poor technical capabilities, 
suggest that the source is only processed into fragments.  Also, the likely explosive has 
changed from incendiary thermite to high explosive ammonium nitrate.  The use of a 
high explosive is better suited in dispersing a processed radioactive source.  Finally, 
evidence of source processing has changed the RDD’s radioactive danger from medium 
to a 48.7% chance of high.  Figure 45 shows the overall success probability for the 
homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced plot with source processing evidence.  Probability of 
source weaponization jumps from 10.9% to 41.6% with the evidence inclusion.  The 
overall probability of success increased slightly from 12.4% to 12.7%.  Evidence of 
source processing increases the radioactive danger of the RDD plot, but it fails to reduce 
the difficulty of actually obtaining radioactive materials. 
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TABLE III 
Homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced RDD plot characteristics with evidence of source 
processing. 
 
Plot Characteristics Network Output 
Radioactive Material Origin: Industrial Facility 
Radioactive Material Type: 
137
Cs 
Presence of Shielding: 47.8% 
Shielding Type: Steel 
Presence of Source Processing: 55.2% 
Source Processing Type: Fragments 
Explosive Type: High (Ammonium Nitrate) 
Delivery Method: Motor Vehicle 
Detonation Type: Suicide 
Danger from Radioactive Material: High (48.7%) 
Capability to Induce Panic: High (42.3%) 
Device Weight: 100 kg 
 
 
 
Fig. 45. Overall chance of success for a homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced RDD plot 
with evidence of source processing. 
 
 
Effect of Evidence for Radioactive Material Acquisition 
 Introducing evidence of radioactive material acquisition significantly influences 
the chance of success for the plot.  Radioactive material acquisition nodes were adjusted 
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to account for the penetration of a blood irradiator facility and the removal of a blood 
irradiator source.  These two pieces of evidence indicate the adversary may have 
obtained a radioactive source.  The results of this evidence can be seen in Fig. 46.  As 
expected, the probability of radioactive material acquisition increases from 12.9% to 
22.3%.  The overall probability of success increases from 12.4% to 20.9%.  These results 
demonstrate two important characteristics of the created RDD Bayesian network.  First, 
final RDD success probability is heavily weighted towards the acquisition of radioactive 
material acquisition.  Possessing other capabilities to employ an RDD, such as delivery 
and weaponization, are useless without radioactive material.  Secondly, the integration 
of real-time intelligence, such as a medical facility penetration, into the RDD network’s 
evidence nodes can significantly change the likelihood of a successful plot.  
 
 
 
Fig. 46. Overall chance of success for a homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced RDD plot 
with evidence of radioactive material acquisition. 
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Plot 2: Apocalyptic Group Plot 
 The second case examined is an apocalyptic, religious group RDD plot.  The 
adversary is similar to the mostly defunct Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo.  
Responsible for the 1995 Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, Aum Shinrikyo was 
extremely well-funded through legitimate businesses and technically competent enough 
to produce homemade hallucinogens and nerve gas.
26
  The apocalyptic group has novice 
tactical capabilities.  However, they have technical capabilities equivalent to those found 
in the lab of a technical corporation, and devote $2,000,000 to the RDD plot.  The 
adversary’s primary motivations are an apocalyptic belief and a religious imperative.  
Fig. 47 depicts adversarial inputs and motivations.  The two motivations suggest a low 
23.6% need for even source dispersal, an 11.2% need for an easily deliverable source, an 
89.1% desire to settle for a crude device, and only a 4.52% need for an IAEA category 1 
source.  These device characteristics are expected for an apocalyptically motivated 
adversary with little need for a well-designed, deliverable RDD. 
The apocalyptic group RDD plot characteristics are seen in Table IV.  The 
analysis suggests that the most likely pathway to obtain radiological material is 
commercial acquisition.  An apocalyptic group, with $2,000,000 in funding, would 
likely be able to acquire a source license and legitimately purchase a radioactive source.  
Technical capabilities equivalent to those found in the lab of a technical corporation 
indicate the adversary may be sophisticated enough to pass regulating inspections prior 
to the issuance of a source license.  Additionally, an adversary with novice tactical skills 
would likely be unsuccessful in an attempt to steal a source.  The radioactive material 
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obtained through commercial acquisition is 
241
Am.  The use of such an alpha-emitter, 
coupled with a 91.4% chance of source processing into a powder, indicates a devastating 
RDD with a high danger level and a high chance of inducing panic.  The moderately 
probable presence of shielding, at 50.4%, is a result of the low penetration ability of 
alpha particles.  
241
Am also emit a low energy gamma ray at 60 keV, but the relatively 
low energy of the gamma ray means it can also easily be shielded. 
 
TABLE IV 
Apocalyptic group RDD plot characteristics. 
 
Plot Characteristics Network Output 
Radioactive Material Origin: Commercial Acquisition 
Radioactive Material Type: 
241
Am 
Presence of Shielding: 50.4% 
Shielding Type: Lead 
Presence of Source Processing: 91.4% 
Source Processing Type: Powder 
Explosive Type: High (Plastic Explosive) 
Delivery Method: Motor Vehicle 
Detonation Type: Suicide 
Danger from Radioactive Material: High (72.6%) 
Capability to Induce Panic: High (67.4%) 
Device Weight: 500 kg 
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Fig. 47. Inputs for apocalyptic group RDD plot. 
 
 
 The overall chance of success for an apocalyptic group RDD plot is shown in 
Fig. 48.  Analysis shows that this plot has a relative success probability of 69.1%.  
Examination of other nodes in the figure shows that a well-funded and technically 
competent apocalyptic group has a high probability of weaponizing a source and 
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assembling and detonating an RDD.  The 70.9% probability of radioactive source 
acquisition, significantly greater than a homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced plot, is mainly 
a reflection of the adversary’s significant funding. 
  
 
Fig. 48. Overall chance of success for an apocalyptic group RDD plot. 
 
 
Effect of Evidence for Radioactive Material Acquisition 
 The introduction of evidence for radioactive material acquisition significantly 
affects the adversary’s likelihood of success.  A node adjustment within the network 
added evidence that the apocalyptic group maintains a legitimate front company.  Many 
applications for radioactive source licenses require onsite regulator inspections.  
Consequently, the presence of a known front company increases the likelihood that a 
source license for radioactive material could be obtained.  Fig. 49 shows that the 
probability of radioactive material acquisition increases from 70.9% to 84.3%.  In 
addition, the relative success probability increases from 69.1% to 81.9%.  An increase in 
the probability of radioactive material acquisition results in a nearly linear increase in 
relative success probability. 
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Fig. 49. Overall chance of success for an apocalyptic group RDD plot with evidence of 
radioactive material acquisition. 
 
 
Effect of Evidence against Source Processing 
 The apocalyptic group network was next analyzed by adding evidence against 
source processing.  The lack of source processing could be attributed to a hurried 
adversary timeline or a lack of certain laboratory facilities.  A node adjustment changed 
the probability of source processing to 0%.  Consequently, the lack of source processing 
left the 
241
Am in a solid form.  The introduction of this evidence had widespread effects 
seen across many pathways in the network.  Table V demonstrates the effects of adding 
evidence against source processing.  The first notable effect was the acquisition pathway 
branched to include thermite explosives instead of plastic explosives.  In the absence of 
source processing, the adversary would likely employ an incendiary device to aerosolize 
the alpha emitting source to permit inhalation and ingestion.  The delivery and 
detonation pathway does not change with the addition of evidence against source 
processing.  However, the danger from radioactive material drops from high with a 
72.6% chance to medium with a 46.3% chance.  This example shows the dependence of 
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device danger on source processing.  The lack of source processing, especially for a 
weakly-penetrating alpha emitter, significantly reduces the RDD’s radiological effects.   
  
 
TABLE V 
Apocalyptic group RDD plot characteristics with evidence against source processing. 
 
Plot Characteristics Network Output 
Radioactive Material Origin: Commercial Acquisition 
Radioactive Material Type: 
241
Am 
Presence of Shielding: 51.3% 
Shielding Type: Lead 
Presence of Source Processing: 0% 
Source Processing Type: None 
Explosive Type: Incendiary (Thermite) 
Delivery Method: Motor Vehicle 
Detonation Type: Suicide 
Danger from Radioactive Material: Medium (46.3%) 
Capability to Induce Panic: High (54%) 
Device Weight: 500 kg 
 
 
 
 
 The overall chance of success for an apocalyptic group RDD plot with evidence 
against source processing is seen in Fig. 50.  As expected, the chance of source 
weaponization drops from 90.0% to only 13.9%.  It is interesting to note that even 
though the chance of source processing node was set to 0%, the chance of source 
weaponization stays at 13.9%.  This can be attributed to the fact that source 
weaponization includes both source processing and shielding.  Consequently, the 
remaining 13.9% reflects the probability of the adversary successfully obtaining 
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shielding.  The overall chance of success of the RDD plot drops from 69.1% to 67.9% 
after the addition of evidence against source processing.  A 1.2% change in overall 
success probability represents a surprisingly small difference after the addition of such 
significant evidence.  However, the overall chance of a successful RDD plot is heavily 
weighted towards radioactive material acquisition.  An adversary with the ability to 
commercially acquire 
241
Am has a probable chance of success in an RDD plot, 
regardless of source processing capabilities.  The effects of evidence against source 
processing are primarily seen in the diminished device danger from radioactive material.  
 
 
Fig. 50. Overall chance of success for an apocalyptic group RDD plot with evidence 
against source processing. 
 
 
 
 
Effect of Evidence for Radioactive Material Acquisition and Subsequent Plot Flags 
 The addition of evidence to the RDD acquisition network clearly demonstrates 
how specific adversarial actions affect the eventual design and overall success of an 
RDD plot.  However, this Bayesian implementation can also be used to predict likely 
adversarial actions prior to the node where evidence is added into the network.  Analysis 
of nodes prior to evidence introduction allows a law enforcement agency to narrow an 
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investigation to focus on likely actions within an adversary’s RDD plot.  This allows for 
a greater leverage of resources against a probable set of adversarial actions.   
 Evidence was added to the apocalyptic group RDD plot to demonstrate the 
presence of plot flags and subsequent focusing of law enforcement resources.  For 
example, consider that the apocalyptic group has expressed a desire to interdict a 
radioactive source during a land or ocean shipment.  Fig. 51 shows this evidence added 
into the node titled ―Origin of Radioactive Material.‖  This evidence changes the likely 
radioactive material obtained from 
241
Am to 
60
Co since a given shipment of radioactive 
materials is most likely to contain cobalt.  The introduction of this evidence certainly 
increases the adversary’s chance of obtaining radioactive material and overall chance of 
success.   
 
 
 
Fig. 51. Transport interdiction evidence added to an apocalyptic group RDD plot. 
 
On the other hand, Fig. 52 demonstrates the effect this evidence has on other 
evidence nodes describing transport interdiction.  The network shows that the adversary 
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is most likely to interdict a road shipment with a 55% probability, while the probability 
of an ocean shipment interdiction has a 45% probability.  Furthermore, the probabilities 
of potential road shipment evidence nodes have also changed with the addition of the 
transport interdiction evidence.  The network suggests that the adversary will have 
knowledge of ground source shipments with a probability of 51.9%, will be employed by 
a ground transport carrier as a non-driver with a 52.9% probability, will be employed by 
a ground transport carrier as a driver with a 53.8% probability, and a source shipment 
will be missing with a 54.8% probability.  Based on these automatic node adjustments 
within the network, law enforcement agencies now have a much narrower investigative 
focus.  Employees of trucking companies should be cross-checked against known 
members of the apocalyptic group.  Those with intimate knowledge of truck shipment 
schedules, such as employees of radioactive source suppliers and consumers, should be 
investigated.  Finally, documented cases of missing source shipments should be analyzed 
for possible connection to the apocalyptic group RDD plot. 
 
 
Fig. 52. Likely apocalyptic group actions based on evidence of radioactive material 
acquisition through transport interdiction. 
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 Plot flags derived from the introduction of evidence into the RDD network can 
be used both passively and actively.  Passive utilization involves comparing probable 
plot flags to criminal activities that may have already occurred.  This would provide a 
good measure of where an adversary is located on the pathway to a successful RDD 
detonation.  Consider introduction of evidence into the network that suggests the 
adversary will attempt to obtain a radioactive source from a blood irradiator.  If 
investigators find that a blood irradiation machine was scavenged in the adversary’s 
known area of operation, then it can be assumed that the adversary has successful 
completed pathways describing radioactive material acquisition.  Active utilization 
involves planning law enforcement actions against probable plot flags predicted by the 
network.  Consider introduction of evidence into the network that suggests the adversary 
plans to travel to Russia to acquire a remotely located RTG.  By cross-checking known 
members of the adversarial group with flight manifests to Russian cities close to the 
Baltic, those adversaries can be arrested in the airport and the plot can be halted. 
 
Plot 3: Drug Cartel Plot 
 The third case examined was a drug cartel RDD plot.  The adversary is analogous 
to the numerous Mexican drug cartels along the US-Mexican border who vie for control 
of areas from government and rival cartels in order to smuggle drugs.  Mexican cartels  
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have carried out terrorist attacks south of the border, to include shootings, assassinations, 
and car bombings.
27
  The cartel has paramilitary tactical capabilities due to wide access 
to military arsenals and thorough training from police and military defectors.  With 
technical capabilities equivalent to those found in a rudimentary garage lab, they are able 
to devote $250,000 to an RDD plot aimed against American soil.  The adversary’s 
primary motivations are war on its own nation and war on another nation.  Network 
inputs and adversarial motivations can be seen in Fig. 53.  The two motivations suggest a 
62.0% need for even dispersal, a 90.3% need for a deliverable device, only a 19.7% 
desire to settle for a crude design, and an 87.8% need for an IAEA category 1 source.  
The drug cartel, waging a nearly conventional war against nearby governments, would 
probably require an RDD that can be delivered easily and from a remote location.  The 
cartel’s motivations imply they will need a large amount of radioactive material to 
effectively wage a war, congruent with the prediction of the cartel’s need for an IAEA 
category 1 source. 
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Fig. 53. Inputs for drug cartel RDD plot. 
 
 The drug cartel RDD plot characteristics are seen in Table VI.  The network 
suggests that the adversary will obtain radioactive material through transport 
interdiction.  A paramilitary tactical capability implies the cartel would likely be able to 
hijack a source during transportation.  Additionally, few technical capabilities and only 
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moderate funding would prevent commercial acquisition.  The most probable radioactive 
material is 
60
Co.  Cobalt shipments are typically IAEA category 1 material.  Shielding 
will be present with a 65% probability, and the chance of source processing is 63.5%.  
The large amount of 
60
Co certainly dictates the necessity of shielding.  The cartel’s need 
for even dispersal and an easily deliverable device requires some amount of source 
processing.  However, minimal technical capabilities explain the prediction that the 
cartel may not be able to process the cobalt pencils past a large, solid form.  The network 
suggests the use of the high explosive nitroglycerin.  Nitroglycerin would be readily 
available in a budget of $250,000.  The predicted delivery and detonation method is by a 
proximity detonated rocket.  A rocket would allow a stand-off capability, and would 
ensure even source dispersal if the rocket is programmed to detonate above its target.  
The network suggests the RDD plot will have a high danger from radioactive material 
with a 58.5% probability, and a medium chance of inducing panic at 36.5%.  Due to a 
rocket delivery, the weight of the device is only 10 kg.  An inbound rocket, with a 
minimal amount of explosives, would likely induce less panic than a vehicle delivery 
method. 
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TABLE VI 
Drug cartel RDD plot characteristics. 
 
Plot Characteristics Network Output 
Radioactive Material Origin: Transport Interdiction 
Radioactive Material Type: 
60
Co 
Presence of Shielding: 65% 
Shielding Type: Steel 
Presence of Source Processing: 63.50% 
Source Processing Type: Solid 
Explosive Type: High (Nitroglycerin) 
Delivery Method: Rocket 
Detonation Type: Proximity 
Danger from Radioactive Material: High (58.5%) 
Capability to Induce Panic: Medium (36.5%) 
Device Weight: 10 kg 
  
 
The overall chance of success for a drug cartel RDD plot is seen in Fig. 54.  The 
adversary has a 56.6% chance of successfully obtaining radioactive materials.  Greater 
than the homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced plot but less than the apocalyptic group plot, 
the cartel’s high tactical capabilities are offset by only a moderate amount of funding 
and a low technical capability.  Consequently, the 56.6% chance of obtaining radioactive 
material hinges on the cartel’s ability to forcefully steal a source in transport.  The 
adversary has a mere 29.9% chance of successfully weaponizing the radioactive 
material.  While the cartel has a significant need for source weaponization, poor 
technical capabilities hamper this portion of the network.  Assembly and detonation 
should be easily accomplished with an 85.5% chance of success.  The overall chance of 
success for a drug cartel RDD plot is 47.3%. 
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Fig. 54. Overall chance of success for a drug cartel RDD plot. 
 
 
Effect of Increased Funding 
 The drug cartel RDD plot was analyzed by introducing increased funding into the 
Bayesian network.  This change was implemented by changing the plot funding from 
$250,000 to $1,000,000.   A sudden increase in plot funding could be attributed to 
collusion with other cartels, or money recovered from a related bank robbery.  The 
significant effects of increased funding are seen in Table VII.  Initially acquiring 
radioactive material through transport interdiction, the network now suggests the 
adversary will attempt commercial acquisition of 
137
Cs.  An influx of money certainly 
increases the probability the cartel would be capable of paying license fees and 
purchasing a source.  The presence of source processing increases moderately from 
63.5% to 70.8%, and the additional funding would likely permit the cartel to process the 
source into small fragments.  Most importantly, the danger from radioactive material 
increases from high at 58.5% to high at 63.6%.  More potent plastic explosives, coupled 
with source processing into easily dispersible fragments, accounts for the increase in 
danger.  As expected, the overall panic inducing ability remains constant.  
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TABLE VII 
Drug cartel RDD plot characteristics with increased funding. 
 
Plot Characteristics Network Output 
Radioactive Material Origin: Commercial Acquisition 
Radioactive Material Type: 
137
Cs 
Presence of Shielding: 71% 
Shielding Type: Lead 
Presence of Source Processing: 70.80% 
Source Processing Type: Fragments 
Explosive Type: High (Plastic Explosive) 
Delivery Method: Rocket 
Detonation Type: Proximity 
Danger from Radioactive Material: High (63.6%) 
Capability to Induce Panic: Medium (36.9%) 
Device Weight: 10 kg 
 
 
 
 
 The overall success of a drug cartel RDD plot with increased funding is shown in 
Fig. 55.  Additional funding results in a higher probability of success for radioactive 
material acquisition and source weaponization.  The probability of success for 
radioactive material acquisition increases from 56.6% to 71.6%.  The probability of 
success for source weaponization increases from 29.9% to 44.0%.  These significant 
changes are reflected in the overall plot success chance increasing from 47.3% to 60.4%.  
Therefore, an increase in funding has a substantial effect on the overall likelihood of a 
successful RDD plot.  This example emphasizes the importance of correctly quantifying 
the funding available to an adversary.  Underestimating available funding skews the 
chance of plot success, and could result in uniformed conclusions about the adversary.  
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Additionally, law enforcement agencies using this tool should be cognizant of additional 
funding being funneled into an RDD plot. 
 
 
 
Fig. 55. Overall chance of success for a drug cartel RDD plot with increased funding. 
 
 
Effect of Change in Adversarial Motivation and Evidence of Specific Target 
 The drug cartel RDD plot was further analyzed by adjusted the adversarial 
motivation and including evidence of a specific target.  These changes were 
implemented by activating the ―Mass Devastation/Chaos‖ motivation node and adding 
evidence that suggested the cartel planned to attack a target in a waterfront city.  It is 
reasonable to assume an adversary may change its motivations mid-plot.  Or, law 
enforcement agencies may have originally mischaracterized the drug cartel’s 
motivations.  The drug cartel may want to exact vengeance on an American target after 
police raids captured a significant number of low-level drug smugglers.  Additionally, 
intelligence tips may report the cartel wants to attack a waterfront city, such as San 
Diego, with an RDD.  Table VIII shows how the motivation change and evidence 
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inclusion affect the drug cartel RDD plot.  Means of radioactive material acquisition and 
the specific isotope obtained remain constant from the original drug cartel RDD plot.  
However, the probability of source processing drops from 63.5% to 46.5%.  This result 
reflects the fact that an adversary aiming for mass devastation would be less concerned 
about even source dispersal.  Another significant change lies in the assembly and 
detonation portions of the network.  The proximity of the cartel’s target to the water 
suggests device delivery by boat.  Additionally, the detonation method has switched 
from proximity to suicide.  The device weight has increased to 100 kg.  Finally, the 
capability to induce panic has increased from medium with a 36.5% chance to high with 
a 41.6% chance.  The increase in panic inducing capability reflects a greater amount of 
explosives and delivery by boat in a populated area. 
 
 
TABLE VIII 
Drug cartel RDD plot characteristics with a change in motivation and a waterfront city 
as a target. 
 
Plot Characteristics Network Output 
Radioactive Material Origin: Transport Interdiction 
Radioactive Material Type: 
60
Co 
Presence of Shielding: 54% 
Shielding Type: Steel 
Presence of Source Processing: 46.50% 
Source Processing Type: Solid 
Explosive Type: High (Nitroglycerin) 
Delivery Method: Boat 
Detonation Type: Suicide 
Danger from Radioactive Material: High (43.1%) 
Capability to Induce Panic: High (41.6%) 
Device Weight: 100 kg 
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The overall chance of success for the drug cartel RDD plot with a motivation 
change and evidence of a waterfront target city is seen in Fig. 56.  The chance of 
successfully obtaining radioactive material and successfully performing source 
weaponization does not change from the initial drug cartel RDD plot.  However, the 
motivation to attempt an RDD attack has increased dramatically from 45.3% to 98.6%.  
The overall chance of successfully detonating an RDD has increased from 47.3% to 
53.4%.  An RDD is better suited to serve an ultimate motivation of mass devastation and 
chaos.  On the other hand, the dangerous and difficult process of weaponizing and 
evenly dispersing a radioactive source makes an RDD less useful to an adversary 
warring with a nation.   
 
Fig. 56. Overall chance of success for a drug cartel RDD plot with a change in 
motivation and a water front city as a target. 
 
 
Extreme Plot 1: Adversary with Maximum Resources 
 The next section of case studies examines extreme plots where the adversary is 
given either the maximum or minimum amount of resources.  These case studies do not 
represent current, real-life adversaries.  However, they are useful in analyzing the 
network’s ability to model emerging threats.  Also, they help to establish the limiting 
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cases of the network, and can help elucidate which parts of the network are most 
sensitive to different types of resources.  The first extreme plot analyzed was an 
adversary with the maximum amount of available resources.  This adversary has 
paramilitary tactical capabilities, developed government lab technical capabilities, and 
$2,000,000 of funding for the RDD plot.  No motivations were selected for this analysis.  
The inputs for this case study can be seen in Fig. 57.  
 The RDD plot characteristics for the extreme case of an adversary with 
maximum resources can be seen in Table IX.  As expected, significant funding and 
technical capabilities result in a predicted radioactive material acquisition pathway of 
commercial purchase of 
137
Cs.  It is interesting to note that the device has only a 65% 
chance of utilizing lead shielding.  This is most likely due to the fact that the adversary 
also has a high probability of obtaining 
241
Am, an alpha emitter, through commercial 
acquisition.  The final device has a 99.2% chance of source processing.  Weaponization 
of the radioactive material is easily achieved with maximum technical capabilities.  The 
network suggests that the RDD will likely be delivered by motor vehicle and detonated 
by a suicide bomber.  Without any specific motivations, the adversary would have no 
need for a more sophisticated delivery method such as a rocket.    Finally, the RDD plot 
has an extremely high danger of radioactive material and a high chance of inducing 
panic within the target population. 
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Fig. 57. Inputs for extreme case with maximum resources. 
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TABLE IX 
RDD plot characteristics for an adversary with maximum resources. 
 
Plot Characteristics Network Output 
Radioactive Material Origin: Commercial Acquisition 
Radioactive Material Type: 
137
Cs 
Presence of Shielding: 65% 
Shielding Type: Lead 
Presence of Source Processing: 99.20% 
Source Processing Type: Powder 
Explosive Type: High (Plastic Explosive) 
Delivery Method: Motor Vehicle 
Detonation Type: Suicide 
Danger from Radioactive Material: High (80.0%) 
Capability to Induce Panic: High (63.3%) 
Device Weight: 500 kg 
 
  
Studying the first extreme plot provides some interesting insight into the 
operation of the created Bayesian network.  Fig. 58 depicts the overall chance of success 
for an adversary given the maximum amount of resources.  The adversary has a 100% 
chance of assembling and detonating the device and a 99.9% chance of weaponizing the 
source.  Both of these tasks should be easily completed by an adversary with maximum 
resources.  The adversary has a 97.6% chance of obtaining radioactive materials to 
utilize in the RDD.  It should be noted that even with the maximum amount of resources, 
it’s not guaranteed that an adversary would be able to obtain radioactive materials.  This 
is representative of the fact that an extremely sophisticated adversary may not be willing 
to settle for smaller, more easily obtainable, radioactive sources.  On the other hand, 
acquiring a significantly strong radioactive source is still a daunting task, even for an 
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adversary with the maximum amount of resources.  The adversary has a 91.6% overall 
chance of success.  This probability appears low, relative to the high chance the 
adversary has of completing the other required tasks of an RDD plot.  However, this low 
overall chance of success is due to the fact that no motivations were selected as an input 
into the network.  Without a motivation requiring RDD usage, a given adversary, even 
with maximum resources, is less likely to attempt an RDD plot.  This nuance emphasizes 
the overall importance adversarial motivation has to the created Bayesian RDD 
acquisition network. 
 
 
 
Fig. 58. Overall chance of success for adversary with maximum resources. 
 
 
Extreme Plot 2: Adversary with Minimum Resources 
 The next extreme plot analyzed was an adversary given the minimum amount of 
resources.  This adversary has novice tactical capabilities, no equivalent technical 
capabilities, and only $1,000 devoted to the RDD plot.  Also, no motivations were 
selected for this adversary.  The network input information for the minimally funded 
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adversary can be seen in Fig. 59.  Similar to the first extreme plot, this case study has no 
real-life equivalence.  However, analyzing an adversary possessing only the minimum 
amount of resources available in the network is still useful.  This type of plot analysis 
can provide information about which portions of the network are the easiest to 
accomplish for a poorly resourced adversary. 
 
 
Fig. 59. Inputs for extreme case with minimal funding. 
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RDD plot characteristics for an adversary with the minimum amount of resources 
is seen in Table X.  The network suggests that the most likely pathway for radioactive 
material acquisition is from an industrial use facility.  Numerous low activity and poorly 
secured radioactive sources in industrial facilities would represent the highest probability 
of success for an adversary with few resources.  The adversary has a 48% likelihood of 
utilizing shielding and only a 36.6% chance of processing the source.  Any successful 
source processing would not convert the radioactive source past its original solid form.  
The likely RDD design includes chlorate high explosives.  Chlorate explosives, typically 
homemade and composed from readily available chemicals, represent the least 
sophisticated and least expensive explosives pathway.  The device would be delivered by 
motor vehicle and detonated by a suicide bomber.  It is interesting to note that this 
delivery and detonation method is identical to the methods predicted for the adversary 
with maximum funding.  These results emphasize the utility of a suicide car bomb for all 
types of adversaries.  Finally, the device has a high danger from radioactive material and 
a low capability of inducing panic.  For a minimally funded adversary, a highly 
dangerous RDD would not be expected.  However, the network’s prediction for 
radioactive danger provided a nearly uniform distribution between overall danger levels: 
high at 37.7%, medium at 32.6%, and low at 29.7%.  The high prediction should be 
analyzed in the context of the adversary’s overall chance of success. 
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TABLE X 
RDD plot characteristics for an adversary with minimum resources. 
 
Plot Characteristics Network Output 
Radioactive Material Origin: Industrial Use 
Radioactive Material Type: 
137
Cs 
Presence of Shielding: 48% 
Shielding Type: Steel 
Presence of Source Processing: 36.60% 
Source Processing Type: Solid 
Explosive Type: High (Chlorates) 
Delivery Method: Motor Vehicle 
Detonation Type: Suicide 
Danger from Radioactive Material: High (37.7%) 
Capability to Induce Panic: Low (37.9%) 
Device Weight: 100 kg 
 
 
 The overall chance of success for an adversary with the minimum amount of 
resources in seen in Fig. 60.  The network predicted the adversary would have a 78.4% 
chance of successfully assembling and detonating a device.  A high probability 
prediction in this node, even for a minimally resourced adversary, is expected due to the 
relatively simple tasks of obtaining explosives and wiring the RDD to detonate.  On the 
other hand, the adversary has almost no chance of obtaining radioactive materials or 
weaponizing the source.  In fact, the adversary has a greater chance of obtaining 
radioactive materials, at 9.84%, than weaponizing the source, at 5.14%.  This result 
demonstrates an interesting behavior of the Bayesian network at low resource levels.  
Obtaining a low activity, industrial use, radioactive source might be possible for such an 
adversary.  However, successfully weaponizing the source is extremely unlikely.  
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Successful source weaponization, at low resource levels, is very dependent on technical 
capabilities.  Finally, the minimally funded adversary would have only a 9.27% chance 
of successfully completing an RDD plot.  This chance of success is nearly identical to 
the adversary’s chance of successfully obtaining radioactive materials.  At such a low 
resource level, final RDD plot completion is nearly entirely dependent on the 
adversary’s ability to obtain radioactive material. 
 
 
 
Fig. 60. Overall chance of success for an adversary with minimal funding. 
 
 
 The study of the network at extreme resource levels provides insight into how the 
model might respond to emerging and future terrorist plots.  A recent upswing in 
domestic and homegrown terrorism likely represents a significant portion of emerging 
threats.  These small plots, orchestrated by a single individual or a small cell, operate 
with a minimal level of resources.   Consequently, effective operation of the Bayesian 
network at low resource levels is imperative to its eventual utility.  The results of the 
second extreme plot analyzed show that for poorly resourced adversaries, the overall 
112 
 
  
 
 
chance of plot completion is significantly dependent upon radioactive material 
acquisition.  On the other hand, an increasing level of collusion between state actors and 
terrorist organizations introduces the possibility of an extremely well resourced 
adversary.  In this case, the above analysis suggests that efforts against the adversary 
must be expanded to include interdiction of source weaponization efforts.   
 
Plot Comparison 
 The analysis of case studies demonstrates a few important conclusions about this 
work.  Most importantly, the predicted plot probabilities and RDD device characteristics 
for each case study provided the expected results.  Achieving the expected results 
implies the network is operating properly and can now be applied to emerging RDD 
threats.  Unfortunately, a true calibration of the created network cannot be performed 
since no historical case studies exist.  However, the probabilities of the created network 
can be adjusted if actual case study data becomes available. 
An overview of the RDD characteristics for each of the five case studies is seen 
in Table XI.  Generally, the Bayesian analysis predicted a different pathway for each 
case study.  The predictions include the use of 
137
Cs in three of the five cases.  The 
recurring presence of 
137
Cs can be attributed to its widespread use in a varying amount of 
medical and industrial devices, as well as its inherently dispersible form.  Consequently, 
this analysis suggests that efforts to secure radiological materials should first focus on 
137
Cs sources.  Delivery and detonation methods also remain relatively constant across 
the five case studies.  A motor vehicle delivery with suicide detonation was predicted for 
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four of the five case studies.  The use of a motor vehicle allows for a significantly higher 
device weight and the flexibility to deliver the RDD inconspicuously.  Furthermore, the 
presence of suicide detonation reaffirms the desperation of many terrorist adversaries, 
and represents a nearly foolproof method of detonating the RDD at the desired time and 
place.  This result emphasizes the importance of building delay and vehicle standoff 
devices around vulnerable areas and likely targets. 
 A comparison of the RDD plot probabilities for the five case studies is seen in 
Table XII.  As expected, the case with maximum resources has the highest probability of 
success, and the case with minimum resources has the lowest probability of success.  
These probabilities are 91.6% and 9.3%, respectively.  An apocalyptic group has the 
next highest chance of success at 69.1%.  A homegrown, Al-Qaeda influenced plot has 
the second lowest chance of success at 12.4%.  These results convey a few general 
conclusions about the overall threat of an RDD attack.  An RDD attack by the most 
likely adversaries is unlikely to succeed.  Conversely, an RDD attack by the least likely 
adversaries is more likely to succeed.  This feature is similar to the threat of terrorist 
attacks utilizing nuclear weapons and other WMD.  Counter-terrorism efforts have 
always struggled with this problem.  How do you best leverage resources against a 
terrorist plot that, although extremely unlikely, would have devastating consequences?   
The question becomes even more convoluted in the case of an RDD attack; a 
rudimentary and simple device can have the same panic inducing capability as an 
exceptionally well engineered device.  While the developed methodology fails to address 
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this philosophical question, it does succeed in quantifying the threat posed by such an 
elusive weapon. 
 
 
TABLE XI 
Comparison of RDD plot probabilities. 
 
RDD Plot Component 
Homegrown, 
Al-Qaeda 
Influenced 
Apocalyptic 
Group 
Drug 
Cartel 
Maximum 
Resources 
Minimum 
Resources 
Motivation to Attempt 
RDD Attack: 95.9% 92.6% 45.3% 75.7% 75.7% 
Capability of Obtaining 
Radioactive Materials: 79.4% 95.7% 85.5% 97.6% 9.8% 
Capability of 
Weaponizing Source: 10.9% 90.0% 29.9% 99.9% 5.1% 
Capability of 
Assembling and 
Detonating Device: 12.9% 70.9% 56.6% 100.0% 78.4% 
Probability of Success: 12.4% 69.1% 47.3% 91.6% 9.3% 
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TABLE XII 
Comparison of RDD plot characteristics. 
 
Plot Characteristic 
Homegrown, 
Al-Qaeda 
Influenced 
Apocalyptic 
Group Drug Cartel 
Maximum 
Resources 
Minimum 
Resources 
Radioactive Material Origin: Industrial Facility 
Commercial 
Acquisition 
Transport 
Interdiction 
Commercial 
Acquisition Industrial Use 
Radioactive Material Type: 
137
Cs 
241
Am 
60
Co 
137
Cs 
137
Cs 
Presence of Shielding: 47.80% 50.40% 65% 65% 48% 
Shielding Type: Steel Lead Steel Lead Steel 
Presence of Source Processing: 32.20% 91.40% 63.50% 99.20% 36.60% 
Source Processing Type: Solid Powder Solid Powder Solid 
Explosive Type: 
Incendiary 
(Thermite) 
High (Plastic 
Explosive) 
High 
(Nitroglycerin) 
High (Plastic 
Explosive) 
High 
(Chlorates) 
Delivery Method: Motor Vehicle Motor Vehicle Rocket Motor Vehicle Motor Vehicle 
Detonation Type: Suicide Suicide Proximity Suicide Suicide 
Danger from Radioactive Material: Medium (35%) High (72.6%) High (58.5%) High (80.0%) High (37.7%) 
Capability to Induce Panic: High (38.9%) High (67.4%) Medium (36.5%) High (63.3%) Low (37.9%) 
Device Weight: 100 kg 500 kg 10 kg 500 kg 100 kg 
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CHAPTER IV 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 The Bayesian network was next studied by performing a sensitivity analysis on 
various portions of the network.  The purpose of a sensitivity analysis is to determine 
how nodes within the network interact with each other.  Many interactions within the 
network are inherently obvious.  For example, subsequent nodes in an acquisition 
pathway will have a significant effect on each other.  However, in a complex network 
other important interactions may not appear so obvious.  Subtle relationships between 
nodes far apart in the network, or nodes in parallel pathways, can extensively affect each 
other.  These interactions reveal which nodes have the greatest weight in determining the 
success or failure of other nodes within the network.  Consequently, a sensitivity 
analysis of a certain pathway can uncover which nodes within the pathway are most 
important to the ultimate completion of that pathway.   
This type of analysis is extremely useful in the context of RDD acquisitions.  To 
complete a given portion of the RDD acquisition network, the adversary must 
successfully navigate a long series of tasks.  Some of these tasks may be mandatory to 
complete the pathway.  Others may be optional.  For example, an adversary must obtain 
radioactive materials to successfully detonate an RDD; however, processing the source 
is not a requirement.  How can a law enforcement agency determine which actions to 
focus on to best halt the RDD plot?  A sensitivity analysis provides a quantitative answer 
to this important question.   
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A feature programmed into the Netica software package easily performs a 
sensitivity analysis on any Bayesian belief network.  The user first selects a node on 
which to perform the sensitivity analysis.  Any node within the network can be selected 
for the analysis, but nodes providing probabilities of pathway completion and RDD 
characteristics are the best options.  Next, the operation ―Sensitivity to Findings‖ is 
selected under the ―Network‖ menu option.  Netica then provides a sensitivity report 
with two parts.  The first part describes how each node in the network affects the 
selected node using several different sensitivity measures.  The second portion of the 
report summarizes how every node within the network affects the findings node.  The 
summary includes three columns: mutual information, percent, and variance of beliefs.  
Percent describes what percentage of the selected node’s results are due to other nodes in 
the network.  This measure was utilized in the sensitivity analysis. 
A sensitivity analysis was first performed on the node titled ―Overall Danger 
from Radioactive Exposure‖.  This analysis can be seen in Fig. 61.  For this and the 
remaining sensitivity analyses, it should be noted that only the top ten affecting nodes 
were plotted in pie charts.  Also, the percentages are not normalized to 100% since each 
portion of the plot represents the degree to which the listed node influences the selected 
node.  Fig. 61 shows that the presence of source processing has the greatest effect on the 
overall danger from radioactive exposure.  A finely processed source is easily dispersed, 
and subsequently inhaled and ingested by the target population.  Radioactive emission 
type has the next greatest effect on danger from radioactive exposure.  Depending on the 
level of source processing, the overall danger could vary depending on what type of 
118 
 
  
 
radiation the source emits.  This analysis demonstrates that in order to mitigate health 
effects of an RDD plot, law enforcement agencies should focus on preventing the 
adversary from weaponizing the radioactive source. 
 
 
Fig. 61. Sensitivity findings for ―Overall Danger from Radioactive Exposure‖ 
node. 
 
Figure 62 shows the results for a sensitivity analysis of the ―Panic Inducing 
Capability‖ node.  This node quantifies the overall ability of a given RDD plot to induce 
panic among the target population.  Fig. 62 shows that the chosen delivery method has 
the greatest effect on panic inducing capability.  An RDD delivered by a motor vehicle is 
larger, likely to contain more explosives, and has a greater chance of disrupting an urban 
population.  On the other hand, a smaller RDD delivered by rocket or mortar would 
contain a smaller amount of explosives and result in less disruption.  Other nodes 
influencing the panic inducing capability of the RDD include the type of explosive 
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utilized in the design.  The detonation of high explosives produces a shockwave that can 
travel for many city blocks.  Conversely, incendiary devices burn slower than the speed 
of sound and do not produce shockwaves.  This analysis demonstrates that law 
enforcement agencies attempting to mitigate the disrupting abilities of an RDD should 
be less concerned about radioactive material acquisition.  Instead, they should focus on 
the delivery method and type of explosives used in the device. 
 
 
Fig. 62. Sensitivity findings for ―Panic Inducing Capability‖ node. 
 
Figure 63 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis for the ―Capability to 
Weaponize Source‖ node.  This node represents the adversary’s overall ability to 
weaponize radioactive material for use in an RDD.  Source weaponization includes both 
source processing—changing the physical form of the source to increase dispersion—
and acquisition of shielding material.  The plot shows that the two most influential nodes 
25.40%
16.60%
10.90%
7.29%
5.92%
4.55%
4.52%
3.51%
2.66% 2.52%
Delivery Method
Capability to Deliver Device
Device Weight
Type of Explosive
Capability to Obtain Explosives
Evidence for Stolen Plane
Evidence for Stolen Motor Vehicle
Capability to Assemble Device
High Explosive Type
Funding
120 
 
  
 
within the network are ―Capability to Process Source‖ and ―Source Processing Type.‖  
These findings reflect the fact that successful source weaponization is heavily weighted 
towards source processing since obtaining radioactive shielding is usually not a difficult 
task.  The third and fourth most influential nodes are ―Funding‖ and ―Technical 
Capabilities.‖  These nodes represent two adversary characteristics.  Successful source 
weaponization requires laboratory facilities and significant funding to handle the 
difficult process of grinding or dissolving a highly dangerous radioactive source.  These 
results demonstrate a few useful generalizations the constructed Bayesian network 
implies.  First, source processing is not likely for a poorly funded adversary with few 
technical capabilities.  Law enforcement agencies should instead focus on countering 
this type of adversary’s plot by preventing the acquisition of radioactive material.  
Second, well-resourced adversaries may be most vulnerable to law enforcement action 
during the source weaponization process.  These types of adversaries will likely expend 
a great deal of resources to attempt source weaponization.  Indicators of source 
processing, such as laboratory equipment purchases, can be used to identify and take 
action against the adversary.   
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Fig. 63. Sensitivity findings for ―Capability to Weaponize Source‖ node. 
 
Figure 64 displays the results of a sensitivity analysis on the ―Capability to 
Assemble and Detonate Device‖ node.  This node represents the overall chance of 
success the adversary has in obtaining explosives, devising a delivery method, and 
detonating an RDD.  The figure shows that the two most influential nodes are ―Type of 
Explosive‖ and ―Capability to Obtain Explosives.‖  Obtaining explosives to utilize in an 
RDD is more difficult than both delivering and detonating the device.  However, the 
other eight nodes listed in Fig. 64 have a relatively similar influence on the adversary’s 
capability to assemble and detonate the device.  This result demonstrates the serial 
nature of this node.  An adversary must complete all three steps of assembly and 
detonation in a sequential manner.  Consequently, successful law enforcement actions 
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against either the adversary’s attempt to obtain explosives, a delivery method, or 
detonation components all have similar affects on interrupting the RDD plot.   
 
 
Fig. 64. Sensitivity findings for ―Capability to Assemble and Detonate Device‖ 
node. 
 
 
 Figure 65 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis on the ―Overall Probability 
of RDD Plot Success‖ node.  This node represents the adversary’s chance of completing 
all required pathways to RDD detonation and gives an overall chance of plot success.  
As expected, the node is extremely dependent upon the adversary’s capability to obtain 
radioactive material.  This reinforces the fact that a successful RDD cannot be 
constructed without radioactive materials.  The second and third most influential nodes 
are ―Type of Radionuclide‖ and ―Radioactive Material Origin.‖  These nodes further 
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reflect the importance of radioactive material acquisition on final RDD plot completion.  
The fourth, fifth, and sixth most influential nodes are ―Technical Capabilities,‖ 
―Funding,‖ and ―Tactical Capabilities.‖  These nodes represent the three adversary 
characteristics defined as inputs into the Bayesian network.  It is interesting to note that 
in terms of final plot success, obtaining radioactive material is vastly more important 
than the characteristics of the adversary.  A terrorist organization with no technical or 
tactical capabilities and no funding can still pose a significant RDD threat if they have 
successfully obtained radioactive material.  On the other hand, an adversary with 
exceptional capabilities and funding will pose little danger without successful 
acquisition of radioactive material.  The sensitivity analysis presented in Fig. 65 
demonstrates that law enforcement agencies should generally focus their efforts on 
preventing adversaries from obtaining radioactive materials.  Also, these results 
emphasize the importance of securing radioactive materials in mitigating the RDD 
threat. 
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Fig. 65. Sensitivity findings for ―Overall Probability of RDD Plot Success‖ node. 
 
 The above sensitivity analysis serves to highlight important conclusions that can 
be drawn from the created Bayesian network.  Unlike a case study analysis, where 
conclusions are drawn about a specific adversary, the results of a sensitivity analysis are 
applicable to all cases and all possible adversaries.  Consequently, the results can be 
used to derive general conclusions about the RDD threat.  These conclusions can be 
summarized in a few key points: 
 
1. Law enforcement agencies should focus on preventing source 
weaponization in order to mitigate the ultimate health effects of an RDD 
plot. 
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2. For a poorly funded adversary, law enforcement agencies should mainly 
focus on preventing radioactive material acquisition. 
 
3. Well-resourced adversaries may be most vulnerable during attempts at 
source weaponization. 
 
4. Successful law enforcement actions against either the adversary’s attempt 
to obtain explosives, a delivery method, or detonation components all 
have similar affects on interrupting the RDD plot. 
 
5. Without specific knowledge of the adversary, law enforcement agencies 
should almost always focus their efforts on preventing adversaries from 
obtaining radioactive materials.  
 
6. The most important step in mitigating the RDD threat involves securing 
radioactive materials.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This work accomplished multiple objectives with the purpose of countering 
radiological terrorism in the form of RDDs.  The first objective was to develop a 
comprehensive network of all available pathways to RDD acquisition.  The second 
objective was to develop an analysis tool capable of predictive modeling of RDD 
acquisitions by various adversaries.  Lastly, the network suggested generalized law 
enforcement actions in  order to combat the wide range of RDD plots.  This was not an 
initial objective of the work, but manifested itself after the performance of a sensitivity 
analysis.  The developed methodology is capable of evaluating the RDD threat posed by 
various terrorist adversaries and integrating with real-time intelligence in order to 
provide an evolving assessment of how close an adversary may be to RDD acquisition. 
 The methodology was implemented in a Bayesian belief network constructed in 
the Netica software package.  The network includes five sections that comprise the 
pathway to RDD acquisition: adversary motivations and inputs, radioactive material 
acquisition, source weaponization, assembly and detonation, and final RDD probabilities 
and characteristics.  Additionally, three separate constant nodes allow the user to adjust 
characteristics describing specific adversaries.  These characteristics include tactical 
capabilities, technical capabilities, and funding.  Numerous evidence nodes within the 
network describe flags or signals that may indicate an adversary is pursuing a particular 
pathway.  These evidence nodes can be turned on and off by the user to customize the 
model to specific threats.  Finally, a set of nodes describes the probabilities of pathway 
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completion and draws information from within the network to predict the danger level 
and panic inducing capability of a successful RDD acquisition. 
 Verification of the developed methodology demonstrated that the Bayesian RDD 
acquisition network was operating as expected.  First, three case studies were analyzed.  
Each of these case studies utilized the network’s customizable inputs to represent likely 
terrorist adversaries.  The case studies demonstrated various features of the constructed 
Bayesian RDD acquisition network and provided evidence of which terrorist RDD plots 
are most likely to succeed.  Next, extreme cases with either maximum or minimum 
adversary resources were studied in order to determine the limitations of the constructed 
Bayesian network.  Finally, a sensitivity analysis was performed on those nodes 
representing overall success probabilities and final device characteristics.  These results 
showed which portion of the network were most vulnerable to law enforcement efforts in 
disrupting a terrorist plot.  The sensitivity analysis produced six general conclusions: 
 
1. Law enforcement agencies should focus on preventing source 
weaponization in order to mitigate the ultimate health effects of an RDD 
plot. 
 
2. For a poorly funded adversary, law enforcement agencies should mainly 
focus on preventing radioactive material acquisition. 
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3. Well-resourced adversaries may be most vulnerable during attempts at 
source weaponization. 
 
4. Successful law enforcement actions against either the adversary’s attempt 
to obtain explosives, a delivery method, or detonation components all 
have similar affects on interrupting the RDD plot. 
 
5. Without specific knowledge of the adversary, law enforcement agencies 
should almost always focus their efforts on preventing adversaries from 
obtaining radioactive materials.  
 
6. The most important step in mitigating the RDD threat involves securing 
radioactive materials.  
    
 The main limitation of this work stems from the fact that an RDD has yet to be 
successfully employed by a terrorist organization.  The lack of historical case studies 
presented a significant hurdle when attempting to verify the operation of the Bayesian 
network.  However, the network was successfully verified against intuitive and likely 
terrorist plots to develop the conditional probability tables that govern the network’s 
calculations.  Future use of this tool should consider any successful RDD acquisitions, 
and assess whether the network operates correctly in the presence of actual case study 
data.  Another limitation of this work included a relatively limited number of evidence 
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nodes.  While the evidence nodes included in the network reflect the most likely signals 
of RDD pathway completion, they do not characterize adversary collaboration or 
deception efforts.  Future work on this tool could include the following tasks: 
 
1. Add additional input nodes to increase the characterization of various 
adversaries. 
 
2. Investigate a method to account for collaboration between different adversaries.  
This addition could allow for resource and knowledge sharing. 
 
3.  Include further evidence nodes that more fully characterize all aspects of RDD 
acquisition. 
 
4. Upon a successful RDD acquisition, update conditional probability tables to 
ensure proper network operation. 
 
 This work presents the first probabilistic modeling of RDD acquisition pathways.  
It will not be a universal solution to the threat of an RDD attack.  However, its 
generalized and adaptable approach will help to focus counter-terrorism efforts in a 
world with innumerable, and often unsecured, radiological sources and a frighteningly 
large amount of individuals willing to do harm to the United States. 
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